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A New Approach to Corporate Choice

of Law
Jens Dammann*
ABSTRACT

The state of incorporationdoctrine, which now applies both
in the United States and in the European Community, allows
corporations to choose the state law governing their internal
affairs by incorporatingin the appropriatestate. Most scholars
believe that this freedom to choose benefits both shareholders
and society as a whole. Against this background, an obvious
question is whether the state of incorporation doctrine is really
the most efficient way of granting corporations the right to
choose. In this Article, the Author argues that while there are
sound reasons for retaining the state of incorporation doctrine
as one mechanism for allowing corporations to choose the
applicable corporate law, it should not be the only such
mechanism because the state of incorporationdoctrine does not
allow corporations to choose the applicable corporate law in
isolation, but forces them to accept certain "side effects," such as
exposure to litigation in the state of incorporation. These side
effects appear to be largely responsible for the general
unwillingness of European firms to incorporate in the United
States. Therefore, federal law in both Europe and the United
States should ensure that corporationscan choose the applicable
corporate law in their articlesof incorporation.

* Visiting Assistant Professor, Cornell Law School; Research Fellow, Max Planck
Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale Law
School; Dr. jur., First State Exam, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt;
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I. INTRODUCTION

U.S. corporations can freely choose the state law governing their
internal affairs,1 a concept that can be referred to as free choice. 2 As
a technical matter, free choice is granted by means of a choice-of-law
rule. Under the so-called state of incorporation doctrine, it is the law
of the state of incorporation, rather than the law of the state in which
the corporation's headquarters is located, that governs the
3
corporation's internal affairs.
The question of whether free choice benefits shareholders has
long occupied a central place in the corporate law literature. Some
scholars argue that free choice harms shareholders because states,
driven by the desire to collect franchise taxes, try to attract corporate
charters by promulgating rules that favor managers at the expense of
shareholders. 4 In contrast, a majority of scholars now seem to hold
the opposite view. According to this group, state competition in
corporate law benefits shareholders, at least on balance, because

See, e.g., Jens C. Dammann, Freedom of Choice in European Corporate
1.
Law, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 477, 477 (2004) ("U.S. corporations are free to choose the state
law governing their internal affairs."); Alan E. Garfield, Comment, Evaluating State
Anti-Takeover Legislation: A Broadminded New Approach to Corporation Law or 'A
Race to the Bottom"?, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 119, 122 (noting that "corporations are
free to incorporate in whichever state they wish").
2.
See Dammann, supra note 1, at 477.
3.
See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate
InternalAffairs, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 162-63 (1985).
4.
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate
Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1999)
[hereinafter Bebchuk & Ferrell, Federalism] (claiming that state competition probably
fails to maximize shareholder wealth); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate
Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663-92 (1974) (perceiving a "race for
the bottom"); cf. Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on
Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1872 (2002) (concluding that states that enact "typical" antitakeover statutes fare better in the race for corporate charters than states enacting no
anti-takeover statutes).
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capital markets discipline managers sufficiently to ensure that
corporations prefer states with efficient corporate law. 5 This Article
does not seek to resolve this debate. Rather, the assumption here is
6
that free choice is at least on the whole beneficial.
In obvious contrast to the attention lavished on the race-to-thetop/race-to-the-bottom debate, comparatively little thought has been
devoted to the issue of how free choice can be organized most
efficiently. 7
In particular, existing scholarship completely ignores
the question of whether it is truly efficient for federal law to use the
state of incorporation doctrine as the exclusive mechanism for
guaranteeing free choice in corporate law.
This Article suggests that the answer to that question should be
no. To be sure, there are sound reasons for retaining the state of
incorporation doctrine as one mechanism for granting free choice.
But it should not be the only such mechanism. Rather, a federal
statute should complement the state of incorporation doctrine by
allowing corporations to choose the applicable state law in their
articles of incorporation. Corporations could thus determine freely
which corporate law regime should govern their internal affairs. The
law of the state of incorporation should only govern by default, if the
articles of incorporation do not contain any choice-of-law clause.
While the analysis in this Article is not without relevance for
charter competition in the United States, its purpose goes beyond the
context of the U.S. legal system. In fact, the primary goal is to gain
an understanding of how any federal or international legal system

5.
This view was forcefully laid out by Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection,and the Theory of the Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 25492 (1977); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 222 (1991) (asserting that state competition "creates a
powerful tendency for states to enact laws that operate to the benefit of investors");
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 16 (1993) [hereinafter
ROMANO, GENIUS] (arguing that state competition "benefits rather than harms
shareholders"); Robert Daimes, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN.
ECON. 525, 553-58 (2001) (finding that Tobin's Q of Delaware firms exceeds that of nonDelaware firms).
6.
As regards the European Community, I have analyzed the reasons
justifying this statement in detail elsewhere. See Dammann, supra note 1, at 507-43.
7.
But see Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter
Competition: Lessons from Patents, Yachting and Bluebooks, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 541,
549 (1995) [hereinafter Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies] (pondering the possibility of a
federal rule that prevents states from imitating the law of sister states for a limited
number of years in order to increase the incentive for innovation); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory
Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 130, 143-45 (2001) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Ferrell,
New Approach] (arguing that the federal legislature should provide an optional
takeover regime that shareholders can opt into without the consent of management);
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 611-12
(2002) (suggesting that federal law should give shareholders the right to bring about a
reincorporation decision even without the consent of the board).
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can organize free choice most efficiently. The importance of that
question is easily explained. Free choice in corporate law is no longer
Rather, as is
a concept confined to the United States alone. 8
explained in more detail elsewhere, 9 the state of incorporation
doctrine-and with it the concept of free choice-recently entered the
In the past, the European Community'"
European stage.
(hereinafter, "Community") allowed its Member States to adopt a
choice-of-law system that prevented free choice. Most Member States
of the Community adhered to the so-called real seat doctrine, which
dictates that the internal affairs of a corporation are governed not by
the law of the state of incorporation but by the law of the state in
As a result,
which the corporation's headquarters is located."
corporations could not choose the law of another Member State unless
they were willing to move their headquarters. 12 Because the costs of
such a move usually outweighed the advantages connected with a
more efficient corporate law, 13 the real seat doctrine effectively
prevented free choice.

8.
It should not go unmentioned that a number of scholars have explored the
relevance of the free choice concept for Canada. See, e.g,. ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note
5, at 118-128 (analyzing various reasons why there is little charter competition in
Canada despite the country's adherence to the state of incorporation doctrine); Douglas
J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. Macintosh, The Role of InterjurisdictionalCompetition in
Shaping Canadian Corporate Law, 20 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 141, 147 (2000)
(questioning the incentives of Canadian regulators to compete for corporate charters);
Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate
Law Market, 36 MCGILL L.J. 130, 182-184 (1991) (claiming that charter competition is
far less effective in Canada than it is in the United States).
9.
See Dammann, supra note 1, at 480 (detailing two recent European Court
of Justice cases putting an end to the real seat doctrine).
10.
In the context of jurisdictional competition, scholars tend to refer to the
European Union rather than to the European Community. See, e.g., Subramanian,
supra note 4, at 1869-72; Joel P. Trachtmann, Regulatory Competition and Regulatory
Jurisdiction,3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 331, 332 (2000). It should be noted, however, that the
law governing the issues of relevance to the concept of free choice, such as the
provisions on the Freedom of Establishment, is contained in the Treaty Establishing
the European Community. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, as most recently amended by the TREATY OF NICE, Feb.
26, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1-87 [hereinafter T.E.C.]. Hence, this Article will refer to the
European Community and not to the European Union.
11.
See, e.g., ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 5, at 132. In particular, Belgium,
Germany, France, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and Greece have traditionally applied
the real seat doctrine. See Bernhard Grolffeld, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht
[Corporate Conflict of Laws], in J. VON STAUDINGERS KOMMENTAR ZUM BURGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH MIT EINFUHRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN 42-43 (Christian von Bar
et al., eds., 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Grol3feld, Internationales
Gesellschaftsrechtl.
12.
See, e.g., ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 5, at 132.
13.
See, e.g., William J. Carney, Federalism and Corporate Law: A NonDelaware View of the Results of Competition, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
COMPETITION AND COORDINATION 153, 169 (William Bratton et al. eds., 1996); Daniel C.
Esty & Damien Geradin, Regulatory Co-Opetition, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 235, 243 (2000).
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Recently, however, this situation has changed. Three decisions
by the European Court of Justice-Centros, 14 Uberseering,15 and
Inspire Art' 6 -have made it clear that the real seat rule, as
traditionally applied by most Member States, is incompatible with
the Freedom of Establishment guaranteed by the Treaty Establishing
the European Community (TEC).17 To be sure, the legal landscape in
the Community is still a far cry from its U.S. counterpart. In
particular, European corporations, while free to choose where to
incorporate in the first place, may find it difficult to reincorporate
later without suffering adverse tax consequences. 18
Nevertheless,
the concept of free choice is no longer confined to the United States.
Rather, it has also become the basic tenet underlying Community
law.

14.
Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R.
1-1459, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551 (1999).
15.
Case C-208/00, Uberseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement
GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919 (2002).
16.
Case C-167101, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v.
Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155, 24 Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP] 1885
(2003).
17.
See id.
95-97
[I]t is immaterial, having regard to the application of the rules on freedom of
establishment, that the company was formed in one Member State only for the
purpose of establishing itself in a second Member State, where its main, or
indeed entire, business is to be conducted.... [The] location of their registered
office . . . serves as the connecting factor with the legal system of a particular
Member State in the same way as does nationality in the case of a natural
person.
Id.; Centros Ltd., 1999 E.C.R.

39, 2 C.M.L.R. at 587-88.

[It is contrary to arts 52 and 58 of the [EC] Treaty for a Member State to
refuse to register a branch of a company formed in accordance with the law of
another Member State in which it has its registered office but in which it
conducts no business where the branch is intended to enable the company in
question to carry on its entire business in the State in which that branch is to
be created, while avoiding the need to form a company there, thus evading the
application of the rules governing the formation of companies which, in that
state, are more restrictive as regards the paying-up of a minimum share
capital.
Id.; UberseeringBV, 2002 E.C.R.

94.

[W]here a company formed in accordance with the law of a Member State (A) in
which it has its registered office is deemed, under the law of another Member
State (B), to have moved its actual centre of administration to Member State B,
Articles 43 EC and 48 EC preclude Member State B from denying the company
legal capacity and, consequently, the capacity to bring legal proceedings before
its national courts for the purpose of enforcing rights under a contract with a
company established in Member State B.
Id.
18.

Dammann, supra note 1, at 490-91.
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Centros, Uberseering, and

Inspire Art may well have set the stage for transatlantic charter
competition. At first glance, that suggestion may seem somewhat
counterintuitive. After all, the Freedom of Establishment underlying
these judgments does not extend to U.S. corporations. 19
Nevertheless, Centros, Uberseering, and Inspire Art are of essential
importance to the existence or non-existence of a transatlantic
market for corporate charters.

The reason can be summed up as

follows: As long as the Member States of the Community managed to
prevent an intra-European market for corporate charters via the real

seat rule, they could hardly be expected to eliminate the various
obstacles that prevent European businesses from incorporating in the
United States. Nor could the United States be expected to address
the various obstacles to transatlantic charter competition existing on
the U.S. side, 20 given that the prevalence of the real seat rule in
Europe seemed to prevent transatlantic charter competition.

19.

21

Cf. T.E.C., supra note 10, art. 48(1).

Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and
having their registered office, central administration or principal place of
business within the Community shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be
treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member
States..
20.
As is shown below, U.S. rules on corporate taxation, securities regulation,
and adjudicative jurisdiction provide powerful incentives for European firms not to
incorporate in the United States. See infra text accompanying notes 27-110.
21.
To be sure, the United States has concluded bilateral treatments with
many European countries, ensuring that the latter have to recognize the juridical
status of U.S. corporations regardless of where the latter's real seat is located. Cf., e.g.,
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, U.S.-F.R.G., art.
XXV(5)(2), 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1954 U.S.T. LEXIS 6, *33 ("Companies constituted under the
applicable laws and regulations within the territories of either Party shall be deemed
companies thereof and shall have their juridical status recognized within the
territories of the other Party."). Treaties that the United States has concluded with
other European countries contain identical provisions. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship,
Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 23, 1962, U.S.-Lux., art. XV(3)(2), 14 U.S.T. 251,
1962 U.S.T. LEXIS 371, *22; Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, Feb.
21, 1961, U.S.-Belg., art. 6(3)(1), 14 U.S.T. 1284, 1961 U.S.T. LEXIS 953, *9-10;
Convention of Establishment, Nov. 25, 1959, U.S.-Fr., art. XIV(5), 11 U.S.T. 2398, 1959
U.S.T. LEXIS 384, *19; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 27,
1956, U.S.-Neth., art. XXIII(3)(2), 8 U.S.T. 2043, 1956 U.S.T. LEXIS 217, *34; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 1, 1951, U.S.-Den., art. XXII(3)(2), 12
U.S.T. 908, 1951 U.S.T. LEXIS 558, *29; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation, Aug. 3, 1951, U.S.-Greece, art. XIV(3)(b), 5 U.S.T. 1829, 1951 U.S.T.
LEXIS 560, *16; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1950, U.S.Ir., art. XXI(3)(2), 1 U.S.T. 785, 1950 U.S.T. LEXIS 261, *28. Other treaties contain
similar provisions. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights,
June 19, 1928, U.S.-Aus., art. IX(1)(1), 1928 U.S.T. LEXIS 103, *1, *14.
Limited liability and other corporations . . . which have been or may hereafter
be organized in accordance with and under the laws . . . of either High
Contracting Party and maintain a central office within the territories thereof,
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With the abolition of the real seat rule, however, that situation
has changed considerably.
For those Member States of the
Community whose businesses predominantly choose to incorporate
elsewhere, it may be in the States' best interests to make it easier for
local firms to incorporate in the United States. After all, such a
course of action may benefit local businesses by giving them access to
more efficient corporate law. At the same time, a real seat state may
not care whether pseudo-foreign corporations avoid local corporate
law by incorporating in another Member State or whether they do so
by incorporating in Delaware. Needless to say, the United States,
too, has every incentive to facilitate transatlantic charter competition.
Given that the outcome of such competition would likely favor the
more flexible U.S. law, states such as Delaware and Nevada would
profit from additional revenue. In sum, Centros, Uberseering, and
Inspire Art are not only a boon to the intra-Community market for
corporate charters, but they may also herald an era of transatlantic
charter competition.
Against this background, it seems high time to focus not only on
the general desirability of free choice in corporate law, but also on the
question of how free choice should best be granted, be it in the U.S.,
the European, or the transatlantic arena.
Part II of this Article describes the main drawbacks of using the
state of incorporation doctrine as the sole mechanism for
guaranteeing free choice in corporate law. Part III suggests an
alternative to the state of incorporation doctrine-namely, a statutory
regime allowing corporations to choose the applicable law in their
articles of incorporation.
Part IV demonstrates the practical
relevance of the scheme suggested in this Article by reference to the
transatlantic charter market. Part V shows that there are no
compelling reasons for retaining the state of incorporation doctrine as
the sole mechanism for exercising free choice. Part VI suggests that
doctrinal reasons rather than efficiency considerations explain why

shall have their juridical status recognized by the other High Contracting
Party ....
The same provision is used in a number of other treaties. See, e.g., Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights, Feb. 13, 1934, U.S.-Fin., art. XVI(1)(1),
1934 U.S.T. LEXIS 81, *11; Treaty on Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights,
June 15, 1931, U.S.-Pol., art. XI(1)(1), 1931 U.S.T. LEXIS 42, *1, *16-17; Treaty on
Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights, Apr. 20, 1928, U.S.-Lat., art. XIII(1)(1),
1928 U.S.T. LEXIS 130, *13-14; Treaty on Friendship, Commerce, and Consular
Rights, Dec. 23, 1925, U.S.-Est., art. XII(1)(1), 1925 U.S.T. LEXIS 134, *13; Treaty on
Friendship, Commerce, and Consular Rights, June 24, 1925, U.S.-Hung., art. IX(1)(1),
1925 U.S.T. LEXIS 95, *11.
It is highly questionable, however, to what extent these treaty provisions actually
enshrine the state of incorporation doctrine. That will be explained below with regard
to the relevant treaty concluded between the United States and Germany. See infra
text accompanying notes 138-59.
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the state of incorporation doctrine, despite its shortcomings, has
become the exclusive means for exercising free choice both in Europe
and in the United States.

II. WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE STATE OF INCORPORATION DOCTRINE?

The state of incorporation doctrine, under which the internal
affairs of a corporation are governed by the law of the state of
incorporation, is a time-tested device for granting free choice in
As early as the eighteenth century, 22 British
corporate law.
companies made use of this rule to conduct business in distant parts
of the British Empire without having to forego the benefits of British
law. 23 In the nineteenth century, French entrepreneurs used the
state of incorporation doctrine to escape the rigors of their country's
24
corporate law via incorporation in England or Switzerland.
Similarly, in the United States, it is the state of incorporation
doctrine that enables corporations to choose the state law they find
most attractive. 25 Even in Europe today, the reemergence of the free
choice concept comes in the guise of that doctrine: the Court of Justice
has made it clear that the Member States must recognize pseudoforeign corporations as legal entities, thereby making it possible for
corporations to choose a state's corporate law by incorporating in that
state. 26 In sum, where legal systems have granted free choice in
corporate law, they have generally done so by means of the state of
incorporation doctrine.
Despite its impressive tradition, however, that doctrine proves to
be a somewhat cumbersome mechanism for exercising free choice.

22.
The earliest known English case applying the state of incorporation
doctrine seems to be a decision of the House of Lords from 1730. See Henriques v. The
General Privileged Dutch Company Trading to the West Indies, 92 Eng. Rep. 494 (K.B.
The decision is analyzed by Bernhard Groffeld, Zur Geschichte der
1730).
Anerkennungsproblematik bei AktiengeseUschaften [The History of the Theories
Governing the Recognition of Foreign Stock Corporations],38 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 344, 345-46 (1974)
[hereinafter Grolfeld, Anerkennungsproblematik].
23.
Cf. Bernhard Grolffeld, Die Entwicklung der Anerkennungstheorien im
internationalenGesellschaftsrecht [The Development of the Theories on the Recognition
of Foreign Legal Persons in the CorporateConflict of Laws], in FESTSCHRIFT FOR HARRY
WESTERMANN 199, 203 (Wolfgang Hefermehl et al. eds, 1974) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Groffeld, Anerkennungstheorien].
See id. at 208-09 (noting that it became fashionable for French corporations
24.
in the second half of the nineteenth century to incorporate in the United Kingdom or in
Switzerland and that this trend was the decisive reason for the triumph of the real seat
doctrine in French law).
25.
Cf. ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 5, at 32, 132-33 (pointing out the essential
role of the state of incorporation doctrine in creating a market for corporate charters).
26.
See Case C-208/00, (berseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement
94-95 (2003).
GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-10155,
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The underlying problem can be summed up as follows: The state of
incorporation doctrine does not allow corporations to choose the
applicable state law in isolation. Rather, it forces corporations to
accept certain "side effects," a prospect that may deter corporations
from choosing the corporate law they find most efficient.
A. Exposure to Litigation in the State of Incorporation
Perhaps the most well-known side effect of the state of
incorporation doctrine is that incorporation in a state other than the
27
real seat state exposes the corporation to litigation in that state.
1. The Legal Rules Governing Exposure to Third-Party Suits
Under both U.S. and Community law, a corporation is exposed to
the risk of litigation in its state of incorporation. First and foremost,
that risk exists vis-A-vis the corporation's external affairs; U.S. states
can-and routinely do-exercise jurisdiction over all third-party suits
brought against domestic corporations. 28 To be sure, the parties can
often avoid that result by means of forum selection clauses, which
most states now recognize as valid if they are reasonable. 29 For
practical reasons, however, it is not always possible to reach an
agreement regarding the forum, especially in tort cases.

27.

See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE
§ 2.11, at 55 (3d ed. 1986); Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporationsin the
Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 365, 374-75 (1992) ("If the foreign state is
geographically distant from the corporation's base of operations, the possibility of more
expensive litigation might significantly raise the expected cost of foreign incorporation.
This potential expense might not deter a closely held Philadelphia company from
incorporating in Delaware, but might substantially chill the similar interest of a small
Chicago business.").
28.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3111 (2003).
29.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan, GmbH, 611 P.2d 498, 503 (Alaska 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 974 (1980); Societe Jean Nicolas et Fils v. Mousseux, 597 P.2d
541, 542 (Ariz. 1979); SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assocs., 640 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Ark.
1982); Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 551 P.2d 1206,
1208 (Cal. 1976); ABC Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Harvey, 701 P.2d 137, 139 (Colo. Ct. App.
1985); Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. Diaz, 378 A.2d 108, 109 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977);
Elia Corp. v. Paul N. Howard Co., 391 A.2d 214, 216 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978); Manrique
v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. 1986); Calanca v. D & S Mfg. Co., 510 N.E.2d 21, 23
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Prudential Res. Corp. v. Plunkett, 583 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979); Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-Fab Indus., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 886, 890
(Minn. 1982); High Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 823 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Mo.
1992); Air Econ. Corp. v. Aero-Flow Dynamics, Inc., 300 A.2d 856, 856 (N.J. 1973);
Credit Francais Int'l, S.A. v. Sociedad Financiera de Comercio, C.A., 490 N.Y.S.2d 670,
674 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); United Standard Mgmt. Corp. v. Mahoning Valley Solar
Res., Inc., 476 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Reeves v. Chem. Indus. Co., 495
P.2d 729, 732 (Or. 1972); St. John's Episcopal Mission Ctr. v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Serv.,
280 S.E.2d 207, 207 (S.C. 1981); Green v. Clinic Masters, Inc., 272 N.W.2d 813, 815
(S.D. 1978); Int'l Collection Serv., Inc. v. Gibbs, 510 A.2d 1325, 1327 (Vt. 1986).
CORPORATIONS
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Likewise, as a matter of Community law, corporations can- be
sued in the state in which where they are domiciled, 30 unless a forum
31
Indeed, exposure to such
selection agreement provides otherwise.
litigation is even greater in the Community than it is in the United
States. While most U.S. states recognize the doctrine of forum non
conveniens,3 2 which may in some cases allow corporations to avoid
having to litigate in the state of incorporation if that state is clearly
inconvenient as a forum, 33 no such doctrine is recognized under

34
Community law.

See Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and
30.
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art.
2(1) 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1-23 [hereinafter CR-JREJJ ("Subject to this Regulation, persons
domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of
that Member State."); see also id. at art. 60(1) ("For the purposes of this Regulation, a
company or other legal person or association of natural or legal persons is domiciled at
the place where it has its: (a) statutory seat, or (b) central administration, or (c)
principal place of business.").
31.

Cf. id. art. 23(1) ("If the parties ...

have agreed that . . . the courts of a

Member State are to have jurisdiction . . . those courts shall have jurisdiction. Such
jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise.").
See, e.g., Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 17-18 (Cal. 1991); Union
32.
Carbide Corp. v. Aetna, Casualty & Surety, Co., 562 A.2d 15, 17 (Conn. 1989); Parvin v.
Kaufmann, 236 A.2d 425, 427 (Del. 1967); Bland v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 506 N.E.2d 1291,
1293-1294 (Ill. 1987); MacLeod v. MacLeod, 383 A.2d 39, 41-43 (Me. 1978); Varkonyi v.
S.A. Empresa de Viacao A.R.G., 239 N.E.2d 542, 544 (N.Y. 1968); Chambers v. MerrellDow Pharm., 519 N.E.2d 370, 372-73 (Ohio 1988); Zurick v. Inman, 426 S.W.2d 767,
768-72 (Tenn. 1968).
It should be noted, though, that the mere fact that a corporation's only link
33.
with the state of incorporation is the corporation's being incorporated there will not
necessarily suffice to invoke the forum non conveniens doctrine. Under Delaware law,
for example, the forum non conveniens doctrine can only be applied in cases of
"overwhelming hardship." See Taylor v. LSI Logic Corp., 689 A.2d 1196, 1197-99 (Del.
1997); Chrysler First Bus. Credit Corp. v. 1500 Locust Ltd. Partnership, 669 A.2d 104,
108 (Del. 1995); Kolber v. Holyoke Shares, 213 A.2d 444, 446-47 (Del. 1965). The fact
that a case's only connection to Delaware is the deferndant's status as a Delaware entity
does not change that test. See, e.g., Mar-Land Indus. Contrs., Inc. v. Caribbean
Petroleum Ref., L.P., Supreme Court of Delaware, 777 A.2d 774, 782 (Del. 2001).
See, e.g., Konstantinos D. Kerameus, Political Integration and Procedural
34.
Convergence in the European Union, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 919, 923 n.14 (1997) ("It must
be noted that the concept of forum non conveniens remains unknown in the system of
the Brussels Convention."); Martine Stuckelberg, Lis Pendens and Forum Non
Conveniens at the Hague Conference, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 949, 962-64 (2001) ("[The
Convention does not contain any forum non conveniens clause."). Both sources refer to
the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968 (amended 1978, 1982, 1989), 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1.
That convention preceded the CR-JREJ and was largely identical with the latter.
As regards the transatlantic charter market, the following peculiarity should be
noted: a U.K. court once suggested that the courts of a Member State may invoke the
forum non conveniens doctrine under the Member State's own procedural law, where
the most convenient forum is located outside of the European Community. In such a
case, the U.K. court argued, the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters does not apply. See In Re Harrods
(Buenos Aires) Ltd., [1991] 3 W.L.R. 397 (Eng. C.A. 1990). Obviously, that decision is
relevant to the transatlantic charter market in that it might allow U.S. firms
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2. The Need to Litigate Internal Affairs in the State of Incorporation
The need to litigate in the state of incorporation can also concern
a corporation's internal affairs. This problem does not usually occur
in the United States. Most states recognize outbound forum selection
clauses 35 and, as a result, a corporation's articles of incorporation can
simply specify the real seat state as a forum. In the European
Community, however, the situation is more problematic. While
Community law generally allows forum selection clauses, certain
internal affairs must be litigated in the state of incorporation, 36 and
37
forum selection clauses providing otherwise are void.
3. The Practical Relevance of Having to Litigate in the State of
Incorporation
In the United States, the prospect of exposure to litigation in the
state of incorporation may deter mainly small businesses from
incorporating outside of their real seat state. 38 By contrast, in the
European and the transatlantic charter markets, the risk of having to
litigate in the state of incorporation may lead even larger firms to
abstain from incorporating in the state whose law they find most
Most
At least two factors justify this assessment.
efficient.

incorporated in the Community to avoid litigation in Europe. Indeed, in the abovementioned case, the court was faced with a conflict between shareholders of a
corporation that had been formed in England, but operated exclusively in Argentina.
See id.
However, two caveats are necessary. First, the relevant case was settled
before the European Court of Justice gave a preliminary ruling. It is not clear,
therefore, whether the Court of Justice would adopt the same view as the English court
cited above. Second, the inapplicability of the CR-JREJ does not necessarily imply that
the national court can invoke the forum non conveniens doctrine. Where Community
law does not apply, the Member States' courts will rely on national law. Yet civil law
systems-which prevail in the European Community-typically do not have the forum
non conveniens doctrine. See, e.g., Stuckelberg, supra, at 958.
See sources cited supra note 29.
35.
36.
Cf. CR-JREJ, supranote 30, art. 22.
The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of
domicile . . in proceedings which have as their object the validity of the
constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies or other legal persons
or associations of natural or legal persons, or of the validity of the decisions of
their organs, the courts of the Member State in which the company, legal
person or association has its seat. In order to determine that seat, the court
shall apply its rules of private international law. ...

Id.
Cf. id. art. 22(5) ("Agreements ... conferring jurisdiction shall have no legal
37.
force if . . . the courts whose jurisdiction they purport to exclude have exclusive
jurisdiction by virtue of Article 22.").
38.
In fact, it is only with regard to close corporations that the literature
mentions exposure to litigation as an obstacle to corporate mobility. See sources cited
supra note 29.
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important, language barriers must be taken into account. In the
transatlantic charter market, the inconvenience of geographical
distance is also bound to be greater than in the United States.
B. Securities Regulation
The state of incorporation doctrine may also discourage corporate
with
corporations
pseudo-foreign
by
burdening
mobility
disadvantages pertaining to the area of securities regulation. In
particular, the need to comply with additional registration and
disclosure requirements may serve as a deterrent to incorporation in
a foreign jurisdiction.
1. The U.S. Charter Market
With regard to the U.S. charter market, the disadvantage is
comparatively small. To be sure, as Ayres has pointed out, the
Securities Act of 1933 (hereinafter, "Securities Act") provides an
incentive for close corporations to incorporate locally.3 9 Section
3(a)(11) of the Securities Act explicitly exempts those securities that
are part of an issue offered and sold only to persons residing within a
single state, if the issuer of such security is a corporation
incorporated in and doing business in that state. 40 The moment a
corporation incorporates outside its real seat state, it loses that
privilege. 41 But the practical relevance of this obstacle to corporate
mobility is probably limited. The courts have interpreted § 3(a)(11) of
the Securities Act rather narrowly, 42 making it-in the words of a
leading treatise--"a feasible alternative in only a relatively few
situations. ''4 3 Moreover, many of the firms that are small enough to
make use of § 3(a)(11) will also be able to benefit from one of the other
exceptions granted by the Securities Act.4 4 Hence, few corporations
will be deterred from incorporating outside of the real seat state for
45
fear of losing the intrastate offerings privilege.

Ayres, supra note 27, at 375.
39.
40.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2003).
See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 343 (4th ed.
41.
2002).
Cf. Midwest Mgmt. Corp. v. Stephens, 291 N.W.2d 896, 910 (Iowa 1980)
42.
(noting that "section 3(a)(11) ...is construed quite narrowly").
43.
HAZEN, supra note 41, at 340.
44.
See id. at 341 n.5.
45.
Another question is, of course, whether the U.S. rules on securities
regulation inefficiently restrict free choice by making it impossible for issuers to choose
between different regimes on securities regulation. But that question has been
analyzed in much detail elsewhere and hence shall not be addressed in this Article.
See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 914-51 (1998)
[hereinafter Choi & Guzman, Portable Reciprocity] (arguing that issuers should be able
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2. The European Charter Market
Likewise, in the European market for corporate charters, the
relevant provisions are unlikely to be a severe obstacle to corporate
mobility because the Member States of the Community have
traditionally shown comparatively little inclination to apply their
registration and disclosure regimes to corporations that are not listed
on local securities exchanges. German securities law may illustrate
this point. Under the German Bbrsengesetz (Securities Exchange
Act), securities issued by German corporations must be registered
only if they are to be listed on a German stock exchange. 46 Similarly,
the German rules governing periodic disclosure and the ad-hoc
disclosure of new information apply only to those corporations whose
shares are listed on a German stock exchange. 47 Hence, the relevant
lead foreign-based
registration and disclosure requirements hardly
48
firms to refrain from incorporating in Germany.

to choose which country's securities law regime they wish to comply with); Roberta
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to SecuritiesRegulation, 107 YALE
L.J. 2359, 2401-18 (1998) [hereinafter Romano, Empowering Investors] (arguing that
state law should govern securities fraud and periodic disclosure so as to allow issuers
to choose between various regimes).
See § 30 (1) Bdrsengesetz (BdrsG), v. 21.6.2002 (BGB1. I S.2010).
46.
Wertpapiere, die im amtlichen Markt an der Borse gehandelt werden sollen,
beddirften der Zulassung, soweit nicht in § 36 oder in anderen Gesetzen ein
anderes bestimmt ist. [Securities that are to be traded as part of the official
market at a stock exchange require registration unless it is provided otherwise
in § 36 or in other statutes.].
See § 40 (1) Borsengesetz (BirsG), v. 21.6.2002 (BGBl. I S.2010) ("Der
47.
Emittent zugelassener Aktien ist verpflichtet, innerhalb des Gesch~iftsjahres
regelmalBig mindestens einen Zwischenbericht zu verbffentlichen.... [The Issuer of
registered shares is required to publish at least an interim report within the business
"); see also § 15(1)(1) Gesetz iber den Wertpapierhandel
year .......
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz-WpHG), v. 26.7.1994 (BGBl. I S.1749).
Der Emittent von Wertpapieren, die zum Handel an einer inlandischen Borse
zugelassen sind, muB unverzuiglich eine neue Tatsache gemdiB § 15 Abs. 2 Satz
1 veroffentlichen.... [The Issuer of Securities that have been admitted to trade
at a domestic stock exchange, must disclose without delay new facts according
to § 15(2)(1) .... ].
48.
For the sake of clarity, it should be pointed out that the above-described
German rules on registration and disclosure requirements cannot, at present, gain
relevance to the market for corporate charters in any case: under German corporate
law, corporations cannot incorporate in Germany unless their real seat is also located
in Germany. See, e.g., BGHZ 51, 27 (28) (holding that a corporation's internal affairs
are governed by the law of the real seat state). Community law does not prohibit this
practice. In its famous Daily Mail decision from 1988, the Court of Justice explicitly
held that:
[T]he legislation of the Member States varies widely in regard to ... the factor
providing a connection to the national territory required for the incorporation
[T]he Treaty regards the differences in national legislation
of a company ....
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3. The Transatlantic Charter Market
In contrast, the state of incorporation doctrine, in combination
with the laws governing registration and disclosure requirements, is
bound to be a severe obstacle to the transatlantic charter market.
The problem in this context does not lie so much on the European
side. Once again, the German rules governing the registration of
securities as well as periodic disclosure and ad-hoc disclosure may
illustrate this point.
As mentioned before, the scope of the
application of the relevant rules is restricted to securities listed in
Germany. 49 Registration and disclosure duties under U.S. securities
law, however, are likely to be a fundamental obstacle to transatlantic
charter competition.
a. The Securities Act of 1933
Of particular importance in this context is § 5 of the Securities
Act. Under this provision, an issuer has to file a registration
statement 50 and, under certain circumstances, distribute a prospectus
to investors. 51 According to its wording, § 5 covers all offers and sales
of securities that "make use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce." 52 It is
important to note, in this context, that interstate commerce in this
sense is not just commerce between the states. Rather, Securities Act
§ 2(7) makes it clear that the term "interstate commerce" includes
"trade or commerce in securities or any transportation or
communication relating thereto" between "any foreign country and
any State. '53 Hence, if a European firm's U.S. lawyers get involved in
the transaction via telephone calls, the preconditions for interstate
54
commerce may already be met.

concerning the required connecting factor . . . as [a problem] which [is] not
resolved by the rules concerning the right of establishment....
See Case C-81/87, Queen v. HM Treasury & Commissioners of Inland Revenue ex parte
20-23, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 713,
Daily Mail & General Trust plc, 1988 E.C.R. 5483,
725-26 (1988).
49.
See supratext accompanying notes 46-47,
50.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77(e)(a) (2003).
51.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77(e)(b)(2) (2003).
52.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77(e)(a)(1) (2003).
53.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(a)(7) (2003).
54.
Cf. Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 870 (1961) (holding that interstate commerce was involved where the
defendant, a resident of Oregon and sole owner of a corporation, and plaintiff, also a
resident of Oregon, negotiated in that state for sale of stock to plaintiff in which
negotiations were broken off, and later defendant telephoned from Oregon to plaintiff
in Washington to request that the latter return to Oregon and resume negotiations,
which he did, and in purchase of stock was defrauded).
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Admittedly, the scope of application of § 5 is limited by
Regulation S, which is contained in Rules 901 through 904 of the
Securities Act. 55 According to Rule 901, § 5 does not apply to "offers
and sales that occur outside the United States. ' 56 From this wording,
one might get the impression that European firms, whose only
connection with the United States is their statutory domicile in
Delaware, will easily be able to avoid the application of § 5 as long as
they do not seek access to U.S. capital markets. But that impression
would be wrong. While such firms can indeed manage to prevent the
application of § 5, the necessary steps can be burdensome.
In order to be certain that Regulation S applies, one has to
ensure that a transaction falls under one of the two safe harbor
provisions that the Regulation sets out. One of these safe harbors is
contained in Rule 903 and concerns issuers. 57 The other is governed
by Rule 904 and applies to persons "other than the issuer, a
distributor, any of their respective affiliates . . . or any person acting
on behalf of any of the foregoing. '58 Rule 904, in other words,
concerns the resale of securities by third parties. Any offer or sale
that meets the requirements of either Rule is "deemed to occur
6
outside the United States" 59 and is therefore exempt from § 5. 0
But shares issued by U.S. corporations, even if headquartered
abroad, do not easily fulfill the preconditions set forth by Rule 903 or
Rule 904.61 Consider, first, Rule 903. For that Rule to apply,
securities must meet three requirements. Two of these requirements
are met relatively easily: the offer or sale must be made in an offshore
transaction, 62 and there must be no directed selling efforts in the
The third requirement is, however, far more
United States. 63
challenging: the transaction has to fall into one of the three categories
set out in Rule 903(b). 64 Shares issued by U.S. corporations will

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See
See
See
See
See
See

17
17
17
17
17
17

C.F.R. §§ 230.901-904 (2003).
C.F.R. § 230.901 (2003).
C.F.R. § 230.903(a) (2003).
C.F.R. § 230.904(a) (2003).
C.F.R. §§ 230.903(a), 230.904(1) (2003).
C.F.R. § 230.902 (2003).

61.
Cf. Merritt B. Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S.
Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 MICH. L. REV. 696, 709
(1998) [hereinafter Fox, Political Economy] (noting that "[u]nder Regulation S, a U.S.
issuer that scrupulously offers its shares only to persons residing abroad and lists the
shares only on a foreign stock exchange will ultimately still have difficulty avoiding
compliance with U.S. disclosure requirements"); Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to

Markets? A PoliticalEconomy of Issuer Choice in InternationalSecurities Regulation,
2002 WIS. L. REV. 1363, 1376 n.55 (pointing out that "[p]ractical application of
Regulation S and Exchange Act registration rules to U.S. issuers also makes it highly
unlikely that even a U.S. firm that publicly offers shares only abroad could avoid U.S.
disclosure rules").
62.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(a)(1) (2003).
63.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(a)(2) (2003).
64.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(a)(3) (2003).
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generally not fit into categories one or two. Some narrowly drafted
exemptions notwithstanding, these two categories apply mainly to
securities offered by non-U.S. issuers as well as non-convertible debt
securities offered by domestic issuers.6 5 That leaves European firms
incorporated in the United States with category three. But in order
for its shares to fall into that category, a corporation has to shoulder a
significant burden: as a general rule, a corporation issuing equity
securities has to respect a one-year compliance period 66 that begins
when the securities are first offered in reliance on Regulation S or the
date of closing of the offering, whichever is later. 67 Offers or sales
made prior to the expiration of that compliance period have to meet a
number of conditions. Most important, the sale must not be made to
a U.S. person.68 Obviously, that condition is bound to be challenging,
should a substantial number of European firms be incorporated in the
United States, because Rule 902 makes it clear that U.S. corporations
count as U.S. persons. 69 Furthermore, the purchaser must certify
that he is not a U.S. person and is not acquiring the securities for the
account or benefit of any U.S. person. 70 The purchaser of the
securities must also agree to resell the relevant securities only in
accordance with the provisions of Regulation S or pursuant to an
available exemption from registration. 71 Last but not least, the
securities must contain a legend to the effect that transfer is
prohibited except in accordance with the provisions of Regulation S,
pursuant to registration under the Act, or pursuant to an available
exemption from registration. 72 In sum, while the preconditions set
forth by Rule 903 are by no means impossible to fulfill, European
firms incorporated in the United States will probably find compliance
73
with the relevant provisions to be at least highly inconvenient.
A similar picture emerges with regard to Rule 904, which also
imposes significant restrictions. Like Rule 903, the offer or sale must

65.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.903(b)(1)-(2) (2003).
66.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(f) (2003).
67.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(f).
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(A) (2003).
68.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(k)(ii) (2003).
69.
70.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(1) (2003).
71.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2) (2003).
72.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(3) (2003).
73.
It is no surprise, therefore, that a shorter compliance period is sometimes
suggested. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, The Unfounded Fear of Regulation S: Empirical
Evidence on Offshore Securities Offerings, 50 DUKE L.J. 663, 671 (2000) (suggesting
that a more tailored response to the specific risks of offshore offerings should allow
regulators to shorten the compliance period); Jon B. Jordan, Regulation S and Offshore
Capital: Will the New Amendments Rid the Safe Harborof Pirates?, 19 NW. J. INT'L L.
& BUs. 58, 129 (1998) (arguing that if the amendments to Regulation S discussed
therein prevent the abuse of Regulation S, then the SEC should consider shortening
the compliance period from one year to six months).
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be made in an offshore transaction, 74 and no directed selling efforts
can be made in the United States.7 5 Furthermore, neither the seller
nor any person acting on its behalf must know that the offeree or
buyer is a U.S. person. 76 Finally, if the seller knows that the buyer is
a dealer or is receiving remuneration, the seller must send a
confirmation or other notice that the securities may be offered or sold
during the distribution compliance period only in accordance with the
provisions of Regulation S, pursuant to registration under the
77
Securities Act or pursuant to an available exemption.
To the extent that European firms are unable to meet the
requirements of Regulation S, they will also be unable to avoid
completely the antifraud provisions of U.S. securities law because §
11 of the Securities Act imposes civil liability for false registration
statements. 78 The application of that provision is unlikely to fail for
jurisdictional reasons, given that the claim is based on a statement
79
registered in the United States.

74.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.904(a)(1) (2003).
75.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.904(a)(2) (2003).
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.904(b)(1)(i) (2003).
76.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.904(b)(1)(ii) (2003).
77.
78.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(a) (2003).
79.
By contrast, European firms may well be able to avoid the application of
Rule 10b-5, under s. 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act (SEA), as long as they
manage to confine their activities to Europe and do not have their shares listed in the
United States. Rule 10b-5, under § 10(b) of the SEA, applies to all transactions "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)(5)
It is not entirely clear to what extent that provision covers offshore
(2003).
transactions. Cf., e.g., Choi & Guzman, Portable Reciprocity, supra note 45, at 912
(noting that courts "have grappled with the issue of extraterritoriality on a case-bycase basis"). The wording of the Exchange Act is once again fairly expansive. Section
10(b) of the SEA only requires the use of "any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce." See 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2003). As mentioned above, interstate commerce
includes "communication . . . between any foreign country and any State." See 15
U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(17) (2003). But the question remains to what degree there are
jurisdictional limits to the application of s. 10(b) of the SEA. The SEC has so far failed
to clarify the reach of Rule 10b-5 outside the United States, leaving the issue to the
courts. See Choi & Guzman, PortableReciprocity, supra note 45, at 912. U.S. courts
have developed two tests in this context-namely, the conduct test and the effects test.
See id. Under both tests, European firms incorporated in the United States will likely
be able to avoid the application of § 10(b) of the SEA.
Thus, under the conduct test, it is decisive where the conduct leading to the
violation of § 10b-5 of the SEA has taken place. Courts hold different views, however,
as to the question of what constitutes conduct. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T.
Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritorialityof American Securities Laws, 17 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 207, 217 (1996). According to one theory, the antifraud provisions "do
not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the United States
unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within the United States directly caused such
losses." See Europe & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London,
147 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974,
993 (2d Cir. 1975)); Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983)
(citing Bersch). Other courts have adopted a more aggressive position, considering it
sufficient for jurisdictional purposes that "at least some activity designed to further a
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b. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The duties imposed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(hereinafter, "Exchange Act") are even harder to avoid for U.S.
corporations headquartered in Europe. Of essential importance in
this context is § 12(g)(1) of the Exchange Act, which imposes a
registration requirement for equity securities not listed on a national
stock exchange if the issuer is engaged in interstate commerce, has
more than 500 shareholders of record, and more than $10 million in
assets.8 0 Section 12(g)(1) does not draw any distinction between
Hence, even if a U.S.
foreign and private security holders.8 1
corporation's shareholders are exclusively in Europe, they may still
have to comply with the registration requirement imposed by §
82
12(g)(1).

fraudulent scheme occurs within this country," see Sec. Exch. Comm'n v. Kasser, 548
F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977), or assuming jurisdiction "whenever there has been
significant conduct with respect to the alleged violations in the United States." See
Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 524 (8th Cir. 1973). Under both views,
European corporations should be able to escape liability as long as they do not register
false information with the SEC and confine all their activities to Europe.
Under the effects test, the antifraud provisions can apply to events taking place outside
the United States, "at least when the transactions involve stock registered and listed
on a national securities exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of American
investors." See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). But under that test, European firms should find it even
easier to avoid the application of Rule 10b-5. They simply have to ensure that their
shares are not registered or listed in the United States.
It should be noted that the above-described reasoning also applies to § 12(a)(2) of
the SEA, which governs civil liability with respect to prospectuses and
communications. Cf. CL-Alexanders Laing & Cruickshank v. Goldfeld, 709 F. Supp.
472, 476-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (applying the conduct test and the effects test).
More precisely, § 12(g)(1) SEA applies to issuers with total assets of more
80.
3
than $1,000,000. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (2003). However, Rule 12(g)( ) contains an
exemption for issuers with assets totaling less than $10,000,00. See 17 C.F.R. 240.12g1 (2004).
See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 61, at 715 n.47; Merritt B. Fox,
81.
Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom?, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 2498, 2615 (1997) [hereinafter Fox, Who Should Regulate Whom?]. In fact, the
only exemption to the duty to register under § 12(g)(1) of the SEA that specifically
2
deals with the foreign character of the securities involved is Rule 12(g)(3)-( ). See Fox,
Political Economy, supra note 61, at 715 n.47. That provision, however, does not apply
to corporations incorporated in the United States. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(b) (2003)
("The term foreign issuer means ... a corporation or other organization incorporated or
organized under the laws of any foreign country.").
82.
See Tung, supra note 61, at 1376 n.55 (arguing that "[flor the U.S. issuer,
whether its shareholders are foreign or domestic does not affect this registration
requirement"); see also Fox, PoliticalEconomy, supra note 61, at 715 n.47 (noting that
"[b]ecause foreign issuers are covered unless exempted pursuant to a rule or
regulation... an issuer, being from the United States, surely would, absent such an
exemption, be covered as well, even if most of its shareholders are abroad"); Fox, Who
Should Regulate Whom?, supra note 81, at 2616-17 (pointing out that "[t]he simple fact
that the issuer has gone public, regardless of where most of its shareholders reside, is
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Admittedly, a caveat is necessary. While there is no specific
exemption to § 12(g)(1), the provision that covers the cases at hand,
one should bear in mind that § 12(h) allows the SEC to "exempt ...
any issuer or class of issuers from the provisions of [§ 12(g)] . . . if...
such action is not inconsistent with the public interest or the
protection of investors. '8 3 As Merritt B. Fox has pointed out,8 4 at
least four U.S. issuers with fewer than 300 U.S. shareholders have
requested such an exemption. And while the requested exemptions
apparently were not issued, the SEC made it clear that it would-not
85
object to the issuers' decision not to register under § 12(g)(1).
Nevertheless, the practical importance of this loophole should not be
overestimated.
The lack of a formal exemption means that
corporations taking the above-described road will be on shaky ground,
and most corporations will desire much more certainty before they
are willing to incorporate in the United States.
It should be noted, finally, that the duty to register under
§ 12(g)(1) of the Exchange Act is of particular importance because it
leads to the application of other provisions as well. For example, it
gives rise to the duty to file periodic and other reports with the SEC
under § 13 of the Exchange Act.8 6 Also, subject to the interstate
commerce requirement, the proxy solicitation rules under § 14
apply.8 7 Finally, in the case of false or misleading statements in any
report or other filed document, the corporation may be subject to
88
liability under § 18 of the Exchange Act.
That the above-described extra-territoriality of the U.S.
securities laws presents a serious obstacle to the transatlantic charter
market should be fairly obvious.
As Ayres has pointed out,
registration and disclosure costs under the federal securities laws in
the United States can be substantial.8 9 As a result, few firms
headquartered in Europe will be willing to incorporate in the United
States.

enough to trigger imposition of the U.S. regime if the issuer remains incorporated in
the United States").
83.
See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78h (Law. Co-op. 2003).
84.
Fox, PoliticalEconomy, supra note 61, at 715 n.47.
85.
See Equitable American Property Company, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1989 WL 246608 (Dec. 19, 1989); Paribas Properties, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988
WL 233751 (Feb. 29, 1988); States Properties, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL
108725 (Nov. 30, 1987); Petrogen Petroleum, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL
108480 (Oct. 12, 1987).
86.
See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78m (Law. Co-op. 2003).
87.
See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78n (Law. Co-op. 2003).
88.
See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78r (Law. Co-op. 2003).
89.
See Ayres, supra note 27, at 375.
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C. Double Taxation
The state of incorporation doctrine can also be an obstacle to
corporate mobility in that the decision to incorporate in a jurisdiction
other than the real seat state can subject corporations to doubletaxation.
1. The U.S. Charter Market
It should be noted that this problem does not concern the U.S.
charter market. U.S. states competing for corporate charters have
every incentive to refrain from imposing income taxes on corporations
whose only connection with the state is their statutory domicile.
Consequently, Delaware has a corporate income tax of 8.7 percent, 90
but profits made in other states are not taxed. 91 Taxes imposed by
the real seat state no longer constitute an obstacle to corporate
mobility either. Faced with an Alabama statute that imposed higher
franchise taxes on foreign corporations than on domestic ones, the
U.S. Supreme Court has recently made it clear that the Commerce
92
Clause prohibits such discrimination.
2. The European Charter Market
In the European market for corporate charters, double taxation
The bilateral
is not an obstacle to corporate mobility either.
agreements between the Member States of the European Community
to avoid double taxation typically follow the Model Double Taxation
Convention on Income and Capital (MDTC) of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 9 3 As a result,
corporations have little to fear from incorporating in another Member
State. According to MDTC Articles 3(1)(d) and 7(1), the profits of an
enterprise carried on by the resident of a Contracting State shall, in
principle,9 4 be taxed only in that Contracting State. The decisive
question, therefore, is where a pseudo-foreign corporation resides.
That question is answered by MDTC Article 4(1). Under that
provision, both the place of management and the place of

90.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902(a) (2003).
91.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902(b) (2003).
92.
South Central Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 170-71 (1999).
93.
See, e.g., OTTO H. JACOBS, INTERNATIONALE UNTERNEHMENSBESTEUERUNG
68 (4th ed. 1999) (on file with author). For the text of the MDTC, see OECD, MODEL
TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL: CONDENSED VERSION (1996). The text of
the convention is also available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd152/34/1914467.pdf.
94.
An exemption applies if the enterprise carries on business in the other
contracting state through a permanent establishment situated therein. See art. 7(1)
MDTC, reprinted in OECD, supra note 93.
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incorporation suffice to establish residency. Obviously, with regard to
corporations of the type at issue, this provision would often lead the
corporation to reside in both the real seat state and the state of
incorporation. To eliminate this problem, Article 4(3) declares the
place of effective management to be decisive. It follows that the
pseudo-foreign corporation will have to pay income taxes only in the
real seat state. 95
3. The Transatlantic Charter Market
By contrast, double taxation is bound to be an important obstacle
to the transatlantic charter market. In particular, European firms
may well be deterred from incorporating in the United States for fear
of being subject to additional taxes. The governing rules are highly
complex, and because of the existence of bilateral agreements, they
may differ depending on which European country is involved. Hence,
it is beyond the scope of this Article to undertake a comprehensive
analysis of the problem at hand. But the general problem can easily
be illustrated by focusing on the example of a firm that is
headquartered and operates exclusively in Germany but is
incorporated in the United States.
In principle, such a firm would be subject to corporate level
income taxes both in the United States and in Germany with regard
to its income derived in Germany. Under § 1(1)(4) of the German
Corporate Income Tax Act (Krperschaftssteuergesetz), any legal
person having its corporate headquarters (Geschdftsleitung) in
Germany is subject to German corporate taxation with regard to its
worldwide income. 96 At the same time § 7701(4) of the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) makes it clear that a corporation formed in the
United States is considered a domestic corporation. As such, it is
subject to U.S. federal income taxation with regard to its worldwide
97
income.

95.
See art. 7(1) MDTC, reprinted in OECD, supra note 93. Of course, the
question remains whether the Member States might impose higher taxes on dividends
distributed by pseudo-foreign corporations than on dividends distributed by domestic
corporations. But such discrimination would presumably violate the Freedom of
Establishment, given that there is no reason for treating pseudo-foreign corporations
differently from domestic ones in the area of taxation. In any case, the Member States
do not seem to draw any distinction between domestic and pseudo-foreign corporations
when it comes to taxes imposed on dividends.
See, e.g., § 2(1) German
Einkommensteuergesetz 2002 (EStG 2002), v. 19.10.2002 (BGB1. I S.4210) (on file with
author) [hereinafter EStG 2002].
96.
See § i(1) Kdrperschaftsteuergesetz 2002 (KStG 2002), v. 15.10.2002 (BGBI.
I S.4144) (on file with author) [hereinafter KStG 2002].
97.
See 26 U.S.C.S. § 11(a) (Law. Co-op. 2003) ("A tax is hereby imposed for
each taxable year on the taxable income of every corporation."); see also REUVEN S. AVIYONAH, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 13 (2002) (noting that U.S. tax law subjects
U.S. citizens to taxation with regard to their world-wide income).
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The U.S.-German Tax Treaty does not eliminate this problem. 98
In principle, the relevant provisions of the Treaty follow those of the
above-described MDTC. 99 The Tax Treaty, however, is far less
generous with regard to cases in which a corporation's place of
incorporation and place of management differ. Unlike MDTC Article
4(3), Article 4(3) of the Tax Treaty does not declare the effective place
of management to be decisive; rather, this provision makes it clear
that if a corporation resides in both Contracting States, then the
competent authorities of the Contracting States shall seek to
determine through consultation where the relevant corporation is
deemed to reside.' 0 0
If they are unable to agree, then both
Contracting States can subject the corporation to taxation with
regard to its worldwide income. It is crucial to note, in this context,
that the Tax Treaty does not impose any duty on the authorities
involved to make the relevant determination 10 ' and, as a practical
matter, the chances of an agreement being reached are considered to
102
be rather low.
As a result, U.S.-German corporations of the type at issue have
to depend on U.S. as well as on German law to grant them unilateral
relief. German law allows corporations to deduct foreign taxes from
their income,' 0 3 but that option only reduces, and does not eliminate,
the burden imposed by U.S. taxation. The IRC is more generous,

98.
Convention Between the United States of America and the Federal
Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes,
Aug. 29, 1989, U.S.-F.R.G., S. TREATY Doc. No. 101-10 (1990) [hereinafter Tax Treaty].
99.
According to art. 7(1) of the Tax Treaty, the business profits of an
enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State unless the
enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent
establishment situated therein. Moreover, like art. 3(1)(d) MDTC, art. 3(1)(f) of the
Tax Treaty provides that the terms "enterprise of a Contracting State" and "enterprise
of the other Contracting State" mean respectively an enterprise carried on by a
resident of a Contracting State and an enterprise carried on by a resident of the other
Contracting State. Article 4(1) of the Treaty provides that the term "resident of a
Contracting State" means any person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax
therein by reason of his domicile, residence, place of management, place of
incorporation, or any other criterion of a similar nature.
100.
See also FRIEDHELM JACOB ET AL., HANDBOOK ON THE 1989 DOUBLE
TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, art. 4, 53,
277 (2002) (noting that "[n]o tiebreaker rule
is available if a corporation ... is a dual resident").

101.
Siehe Wolff, USA, in HELMUT DEBATIN & FRANZ WASSERMEYER,
DOPPELBESTEUERUNG, Bd. VI, USA, Art. 4 USA 67 (on file with author).
67; see also KLAUS GROIBMANN, DOPPELT
102.
Wolff, supra note 101,
ANSASSIGE KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN IM INTERNATIONALEN STEUERRECHT 80 (1995) (on
file with author) (noting that the national tax authorities may well fail to reach an
agreement).
103.
See EstG 2002, supra note 95, § 34 c. III; KStg 2002, supra note 96, § 26 VI
1. Foreign tax credits are only available to the extent that foreign taxes have been paid
on foreign income. See KStG 2002, supra note 96, § 26 VI 1.

74

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38.'51

allowing the relevant corporation to reduce its tax burden by means
of foreign tax credits. 10 4
But these foreign tax credits do not
completely eliminate the problem at hand either. Needless to say,
they do not save corporations from having to file an income tax
return, a task that is all the more burdensome because the rules
governing foreign tax credits are extremely complex' 0 5 and because
the U.S. rules on the computation of taxable income differ
considerably from their German counterparts.10 6 More important,
U.S. law limits the availability of foreign tax credits in various
ways.' 0 7 Also, such credits are of limited use when the taxes to be
paid in the United States in a specific case are higher than those that
are due in the foreign jurisdictions.10 8 That is particularly relevant
in the case at hand, because Germany has a uniform corporate
income tax rate of only 26.5 percent.' 0 9 By contrast, the rates set by
the IRC, while differing according to the size of a corporation's
income, are often much higher: 110 While corporations pay only fifteen
percent on the first $50,000 and twenty-five percent of the following
$25,000, the tax rate is currently set at thirty-four percent for the
portion of taxable income that falls between $75,000 and $10 million.
To the extent that a corporation's income exceeds $10 million, the
corporate income tax rate is set at thirty-five percent. As a result of
the higher U.S. rates, the tax credits accorded to German-based firms
incorporated in the United States will generally be of limited use.
Hence, such firms will pay dearly for the use of U.S. corporate law."'
In sum, as long as the state of incorporation doctrine remains the

104.
105.

See 26 U.S.C.S. § 901 (Law. Co-op. 2003).
See, e.g., Ann Duvall Alsobrook, Note and Comment, Improving the

Competitiveness of U.S. Multinational Corporations Through Changes to the Foreign
Tax Credit, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY 875, 877-78 (1997) (noting that "experts
criticize the foreign tax credit limitation as one of the most unnecessarily complex
provisions of United States international tax law").
106.
For a comparison of German and U.S. rules on the computation of taxable
income, see KAI M. REUSCH, DAS BILANZSTEUERRECHT DER VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON
AMERIKA 31-266 (2002) (on file with author).
107.
For an overview, see Alsobrook, supra note 105, at 887-96.
108.
Ironically, it is precisely the aim of the foreign tax credit system to ensure
that corporations cannot avail themselves of lower taxes by operating their businesses
abroad. The foreign tax credit system corresponds to the idea that the rules on
international taxation should seek "capital export neutrality." See GARY C. Hufbauer,
U.S. Taxation Of International INCOME 49 (1992). In other words, the decisions of
multinational corporations about where to invest should not be distorted by tax
considerations. That, of course, means that the decision about where to incorporate
must be decisive for the amount of taxes to be paid.
109.
See KSTG 2002, supra note 96, § 23(1).
110.
See 26 U.S.C.S. § 11(b) (Law. Co-op. 2003).
111.
It should be noted that an additional tax burden with regard to dividends
can usually be avoided. That is because § 871(i) I.R.C. classifies dividends paid by U.S.
corporations as foreign income to the extent that the eighty-percent foreign business
requirement of section 861(c)(1) I.R.C. is met. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 871(i) (Law. Co-op.
2003).

2005]

A NEWAPPROACH TO CORPORA TE CHOICE OF LA W

75

only mechanism for exercising free choice, national rules on corporate
taxation constitute a formidable obstacle to the transatlantic market
for corporate charters.

III. THE STATUTORY APPROACH TO FREE CHOICE
To avoid the above-described drawbacks of the state of
incorporation doctrine, it is not necessary to abolish that doctrine.
Rather, both federal law in the United States and Community law in
Europe should complement the state of incorporation doctrine by
allowing corporations to choose the applicable state law in their
articles of incorporation. If no choice is made, the general business
corporation law of the state of incorporation should apply as a
default.
Such a statutory approach to free choice would provide
considerable practical benefits: Corporations could choose the law of
a jurisdiction without being exposed to litigation in that state. In
addition, double taxation would be avoided. European corporations,
moreover, could choose U.S. corporate law without having to obey the
U.S. rules on securities regulation. It should also be noted that the
approach suggested above minimizes federal interference. In
particular, it does not require or allow corporations to incorporate
directly under a federal statute.
A. FranchiseFees
Of course, one problem has so far been avoided in this Article. If
one assumes that state competition for corporate charters is
beneficial, the federal legislator has to ensure that the incentives for
states to compete are not diminished. That, of course, is precisely the
risk that may occur if corporations are given the right to choose the
applicable corporate law in their articles of incorporation. To the
extent that U.S. states compete, 112 the most important incentive
underlying that competition is the desire to maximize revenues from

112.
The extent of state competition in corporate law is in dispute. Several
voices have recently suggested that Delaware may be the only U.S. state that seriously
tries to attract corporate charters. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 7, at 580-82;

Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55
STAN. L. REV. 679, 684 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, The Myth]. Others have
doubted the accuracy of that assessment. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Need for
Competition in InternationalSecurities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 387, IV.B.,
text accompanying note 313 (2001) (noting that Delaware is not the only state to
continually revise its corporate charters, that Nevada explicitly tried to become the
"Delaware of the West," and that Delaware would not have to modernize its corporate
law regularly if it did not have to fear any competition).
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franchise fees. 113 If corporations can avail themselves of another
state's corporate law without incorporating in that state, an
important incentive to compete is undermined. The same reasoning
applies with regard to the Member States of the European
Community.
As the author has explained in another article,
Community law presently prevents the Member States from imposing
franchise taxes on corporations whose real seat is located
elsewhere. 114 But if the underlying rules were changed, franchise
fees could become as important an incentive to compete as they are in
115
the United States.
Against this background, federal law could require the states to
force domestic corporations to pay franchise fees to those states
whose law is declared applicable. The amount to be paid could be
determined by the state whose law is declared applicable (hereinafter,
"selected state"). That way, it would not matter from the perspective
of a selected state whether a corporation incorporates there or
whether it declares the law of that state to be applicable in its articles
6
of incorporation."l
Technically, such a system could be organized in a way that
minimizes the burden on the states involved. Federal law could
simply prescribe that if an organization's articles of incorporation
make an explicit reference to the law of another jurisdiction, the state
of incorporation must not file the relevant articles of incorporation
unless the corporation provides a certificate issued by the selected
state, stating that all franchise fees have been paid. Moreover, the
state of incorporation could be required to dissolve the corporation as
soon as the selected state claims that the corporation has not paid the

113.
See Kahan & Kamar, The Myth, supra note 112, at 697-98 (estimating the
additional income that the Delaware Bar derived from the charter business in 2001 to
be around $90 million and pointing out that the franchise fees that Delaware collected
that same year amounted to around $600 million).
114.
See Dammann, supra note 1, at 521.
115.
Id. at 524-33.
116.
Indeed, one may even consider a rule according to which the selected state
is prohibited from imposing higher franchise fees on those corporations selecting that
state's law in their articles of incorporation than on those corporations that actually
incorporate in the state in question. That way, states with attractive corporate law
would be prevented from circumventing the statutory approach suggested in this
Article. But it is unclear whether states with attractive corporate law would have a
sufficient incentive to undermine the statutory approach to free choice in the first
place. After all, that approach will increase corporate mobility and hence serve the
interests of those states that boast attractive corporate law norms. At most, states
with popular corporate law might oppose the statutory approach to free choice, because
it might hurt the interests of the local bar by eliminating the need for corporations to
litigate in the selected state. But it is unclear to what extent the local bar would
actually suffer a financial loss because of the approach suggested in this Article. Most
corporations may still choose to incorporate in the selected state, and the statutory
approach may be used primarily by those corporations whose internal affairs would
otherwise be governed by the law of the real seat state.
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franchise taxes it owes. That way, the state of incorporation would be
free of the burden of calculating franchise fees and making sure that
they are paid regularly.
An obvious criticism of this system would be that an explicit
reference to another state's law can easily be circumvented. For
example, instead of referring to a particular provision in the law of
another state, the text of the relevant provision could simply be
integrated into the articles of incorporation. That objection, however,
is unconvincing. Such a course of conduct does not grant corporations
the specific advantage that comes with a "dynamic" referencenamely, the incorporation of present and future case law. Moreover,
it should be recalled that even under the present system, corporations
can easily incorporate the wording of Delaware's General Corporation
Law in their articles of incorporation without having to incorporate in
Delaware. 117 The existence of that loophole may be undesirable,
because it deprives states of some of the benefits that result from
their corporate law rules and thereby reduces the incentive for states
to maximize the efficiency of their corporate law. 118 But this is not a
problem that is particular to the statutory approach to free choice.
B. Changing the Selected State
To increase corporate mobility, the federal legislator should also
take the necessary precautions to ensure that corporations can freely
change the selected state without being subject to an "exit tax" by the
state whose law was initially chosen. Similarly, corporations should
be able to merge with corporations governed by the law of another
jurisdiction without being subject to additional taxes.
The relevance of this problem is easily explained. Traditionally,
exit taxes on corporations trying to reincorporate in another
jurisdiction have been a major obstacle to corporate mobility. To be
sure, this problem does not occur in the U.S. charter market, because
the Internal Revenue Code allows for reincorporation decisions to be
The
structured as tax-free reorganizations under § 368(a). 1 19
situation is more problematic in the European and transatlantic
Consider, first, the situation in the
charter markets, however.
120
Community. As is explained in more detail in another article,

See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037 (2003) (providing that articles of
117.
incorporation "may also contain any provision, not contrary to the laws of the state," for
the management of the business, dividing powers, etc.).
A similar problem was pointed out years ago by Ian Ayres: U.S. states may
118.
have an insufficient incentive to innovate, because other states can easily copy any
innovation. See Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies, supra note 7, at 549 (considering the
possibility of a federal rule that prevents states from imitating the law of sister states
for a limited number of years in order to increase the incentive for innovation).
119.
See, e.g., Subramanian, supra note 4, at 1802.
120.
See Dammann, supra note 1, at 22-23.
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European corporations often cannot reincorporate in another Member
State without having their hidden assets taxed by their old state of
incorporation. To be sure, a directive adopted in 1990 prohibits the
states from taxing a corporation's hidden reserves in case of a crossborder merger between two or more European corporations. 1 21 To the
extent that corporations reincorporate by merging with a newly
formed corporation in the desired state of incorporation, they have
nothing to fear. But the practical importance of the latter rule is
diminished by the fact that such mergers are not always possible.
Some Member States including Germany 122 and Austria 123 do not
124
allow cross-border mergers. Other Member States such as Spain,
127 and possibly Ireland 128
26
1 25
Italy,
Portugal,
the United Kingdom,
allow cross-border mergers in principle, but the legal situation often
129
suffers from a lack of clarity.

121.
Cf. Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of
taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets, and exchanges of shares
concerning companies of different Member States, Art. 4(1), 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1, 2 ("A
merger or division shall not give rise to any taxation of capital gains calculated by
reference to the difference between the real values of the assets and liabilities
transferred and their values for tax purposes.").
122.
See,
e.g.,
Herbert
Kronke,
Deutsches
Gesellschaftsrecht und
grenziiberschreitende Strukturdnderungen [German Company Law and Structural
Changes

Across

Borders],

23

ZEITSCHRIFT

FUR

UNTERNEHMENS-

UND

GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 26, 36 (1994) (on file with author); Georg Maier-Reimer, §
120, in UMWANDLUNGSGESETZ 1216, 19 (Johannes Semler & Arndt Stengel eds., 2003)
(on file with author).
123

See, e.g., THOMAS RATKA, GRENZUBERSCHREITENDE SITZVERLEGUNG VON

GESELLSCHAFrEN 223 (2002) (on file with author).
124.
See AXEL STEIGER, GRENZOBERSCHREITENDE FUSION UND SITZVERLEGUNG
VON KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTEN
INNERHALB DER EU
NACH SPANISCHEM UND
PORTUGIESISCHEM RECHT [CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND TRANSFERS OF DOMICILE
WITHIN THE EU UNDER SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE LAW] 82 (1997) (on file with author).
125.
See JOHN H. FARRAR ET AL., FARRAR'S COMPANY LAW 754 (4th ed. 1998);
FREDERICK GILLESSEN, EUROPAISCHE TRANSNATIONALE SITZVERLEGUNG UND FUSION
IM VEREINIGTEN KONIGREICH UND IN IRLAND [EUROPEAN CROSS-BORDER TRANSFERS OF
THE CORPORATE DOMICILE AND MERGERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND IN IRELAND] 385

(2000) (on file with author); Kurt Lipstein, One Hundred Years of Hague Conference on
PrivateInternationalLaw, 42 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 553, 630 (1993).
126.
See STEIGER, supra note 124, at 215.
127.
See HEIKE BRUHN, NIEDERLASSUNGSFREUNDLICHE SITZVERLEGUNG UND
VERSCHMELZUNG UBER DIE GRENZE NACH ITALIENISCHEM RECHT [THE ESTABLISHMENTFRIENDLY TRANSFER OF THE SEAT AND THE CROSS-BORDER MERGER UNDER ITALIAN
LAW] 266-67 (2002) (on file with author).

128.
With regard to Irish law, the situation does not seem entirely clear. Irish
statutory law does not provide for the possibility of a transnational merger. See
GILLESSEN, supra note 125, at 435-36. But it has been suggested that such a merger
may be possible anyway. See id.
129.
Thus, in the United Kingdom, there seems to be no case law dealing with
this issue. See id. at 385. Similarly, it has been suggested that the Spanish and
Portuguese rules on cross-border mergers may be so fraught with uncertainty as to
preclude such mergers in practice. See STEIGER, supra note 124, at 274.
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In the transatlantic context, the situation is even bleaker. The
above-mentioned U.S. rules on tax-free reorganizations do not apply

if U.S. corporations merge with foreign ones. 130 Similarly, the abovementioned Community directive on cross-border mergers does not
131
apply to mergers between European and U.S. corporations.
It should be noted, in this context, that the above-described rules
on the taxation of cross-border mergers cannot be advanced as an
argument against the state of incorporation doctrine. After all, just
as jurisdictions impose taxes on cross-border mergers, they may
decide to impose taxes when a domestic corporation seeks to merge
with a corporation governed by the law of another jurisdiction or
when such a corporation changes the content of the choice-of-law
provision in its articles of incorporation. It is precisely because of this
possibility that the Community legislator as well as the federal
legislator in the U.S. should adopt the rules on taxation suggested
above.

IV. THE PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF THE STATUTORY APPROACH

The question remains, of course, whether the adoption of the
statutory approach suggested in this Article would likely lead a
significant number of corporations to choose a corporate law regime
other than the one they are governed by under the present system.
While that question may seem difficult to resolve in a definitive
manner with regard to the U.S. charter market, and even with regard
to the European one, it calls for an affirmative answer as far as the
transatlantic charter market is concerned.
At present, such a charter market does not exist. 13 2 But there is

See 26 U.S.C. § 367(a) (2003).
130.
Cf. Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of
131.
taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets, and exchanges of shares
concerning companies of different Member States, Art. 1(1), 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1, 2 (
"Each Member State shall apply this Directive to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets
and exchanges of shares in which companies from two or more Member States are
5 (Johannes
involved."); Arndt Stengel, Anh. § 77, in UMWANDLUNGSGESETZ 792,
Semler & Arndt Stengel eds., 2003) (noting that the directive does not apply to mergers
involving corporations from third countries).
132.
Joachim Berndt, Die Rechtsfdhigkeit US-amerikanischer Gesellschafen im
Inland [The Legal Capacity of U.S. Corporationsin Germany], JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ]
187, 188 (1996) (on file with author). Berndt claims that the creation of a Delaware
corporation is often used to avoid German corporate law. Id. But he does not cite any
sources in support of this claim. Indeed, given that German courts traditionally have
not recognized the legal capacity of such corporations, see infra text accompanying
notes 140-59, it is highly unlikely that a significant number of German firms have
incorporated in Delaware. It should be mentioned, though, that countless fraudulent
advertisements recommend incorporation in Delaware to European firms as way to
avoid corporate income taxes as well as to conceal existing criminal records. The
relevant advertisements, which can easily be found on the internet, typically point out
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reason to believe that it would develop if corporations could freely
choose the applicable corporate law in their articles of incorporation.
That the statutory approach to free choice removes a whole series of
obstacles to the transatlantic charter market has become clear in the
Corporations could choose the law of a
course of this Article.
jurisdiction on the other side of the Atlantic without being exposed to
litigation in that jurisdiction. Additional taxes on corporate income
would be avoided. European corporations, moreover, could prevent
the application of U.S. securities law.
Against this background, the only question is whether the
obstacles thus eliminated are decisive in explaining the present lack
of a transatlantic charter market or whether that phenomenon can be
explained by factors that are unrelated to the weaknesses of the state
In fact, there are indeed additional
of incorporation doctrine.
considerations that contribute to the absence of a transatlantic
charter market. However, while these additional factors are far from
irrelevant, they are insufficient to explain the general unwillingness
to incorporate in a jurisdiction on the other side of the Atlantic. For
the sake of simplicity, the following analysis will focus on U.S. and
German firms. In large part, however, the relevant reasoning can be
transferred to other European countries.
It is not difficult to explain why U.S. firms have never sought to
Corporations cannot incorporate under
incorporate in Germany.
German law unless their real seat is located in Germany. 133 Centros,
Uberseering, and Inspire Art have not changed this fact. These
rulings only govern the rights that foreign corporations have vis-a-vis
the real seat state. 134 By contrast, they do not restrict the right of the
Member States to define the preconditions under which domestic

that disclosure requirements regarding shareholders are far less restrictive in the
United States than they are in Europe. They also praise Delaware as a tax haven,
claiming that Delaware corporations operated in other countries do not have to pay
income taxes. The fact that both the real seat state's income taxes and U.S. federal
income taxes will apply is not mentioned.
133.
Cf. BGHZ 51, 27 (28) (holding that a corporation's internal affairs are
governed by the law of the real seat state).
134.
This conclusion became abundantly clear in the Uberseering decision.
There, the Court of Justice explicitly distinguished the facts underlying Uberseering
from those underlying the famous Daily Mail judgment by pointing to the fact that
Daily Mail concerned the rights of a domestic corporation vis-A-vis its state of
incorporation, whereas Uberseering concerned the rights of foreign corporations vis.Avis the real seat state. See Case C-208/00, Uberseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co.
Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919, 62 (2002).
It must be stressed that, unlike Daily Mail and General Trust, which concerned
relations between a company and the Member State under whose laws it had
been incorporated ... the present case concerns the recognition by one Member
State of a company incorporated under the law of another Member State.
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corporations can incorporate. 135 In any case, Centros, Uberseering,
and Inspire Art are based on the Freedom of Establishment, and that
Thus, the
freedom does not apply to the situation at hand. 136
question remains why there seem to be practically no German firms
incorporating in the United States. A lack of attractiveness on the
part of U.S. corporate law can hardly be the reason. After all, by
incorporating in the United States, German corporations could avoid
both minimum capital requirements and the much-loathed rules on
codetermination. 13 7 If one disregards the various obstacles created by

the state of incorporation doctrine, only three potential explanations
remain: Germany's traditional adherence to the real seat doctrine,
the inability to reincorporate between the two countries, and German

firms' ability to choose U.K. law instead of U.S. law.

135.

See id.

40.

Since companies are creatures of national law, they must continue to observe
the requirements laid down by the legislation of their State of incorporation.
Daily Mail and General Trust therefore formally acknowledge the right of the
Member State of incorporation to set rules on the incorporation and legal
existence of companies in accordance with its rules of private international law.

Id.
136.

Cf. T.E.C., supra note 10, art. 48(1).

Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and
having their registered office, central administration or principal place of
business within the Community shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be
treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member
States.
The various German statutes on codetermination explicitly list the
137.
organizational forms to which they are apphcable, .and they only name certain German
organizational forms such as the Aktiengesellschaft (stock corporation) or the
Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung (Limited Liability Company). See § 1(1)(1)
Gesetz uiber die Mitbestimmung von Arbeitnehmern (MitbestG), v. 4.5.1976 (BGB1. I
S.1153); § 1 Gesetz zur Erginzung des Gesetzes iber die Mitbestimmung der
Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsraten und Vorstanden der Unternehmen des Bergbaus
und der Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden Industrie (MitBestErgG), v. 7.8.1956 (BGB1. I
S.707); § 76(1) Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1952 (BetrVG), Oct. 1952 (BGB1. I S.681); §
2(1) Gesetz iber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsraten und
Vorstanden der Unternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden
Moreover, under the
Industrie (Montan-MitbestG), v. 21.5.1951 (BGB1. I S.347).
prevailing view, the relevant statutes cannot be applied to foreign corporations by
analogy. See, e.g., THOMAS RAISER, MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ [CODETERMINATION ACT]
§ 1, 10 (4th ed. 2002) (on file with author); Peter Ulmer, Schutzinstrumente gegen die
Gefahren aus der Gewerbstdtigheit inldndischer Zweigniederlassungen von
Kapitalgesellschaften mit fiktivem Auslandssitz [Protective Mechanisms Against the
Risks Resulting from the Activities of Domestic Branch Offices of Pseudo-Foreign
Corporations],54 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 662, 663 (1999) (on file with author).
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A. The Real Seat Doctrine
First and foremost, one might be tempted to explain the
unwillingness of German firms to incorporate in the United States by
Germany's traditional adherence to the real seat doctrine. Germany
has historically refused to recognize the legal personality of a
corporation formed under foreign law but having its real seat in
Instead, such organizations were treated as
Germany. 138
partnerships, and all their shareholders were subject to unlimited
liability. 13 9 Upon closer examination, that explanation proves
unsatisfying because it has long been unclear to what extent
Germany can apply the real seat rule to corporations incorporated in
Article XXV of the Treaty of Friendship,
the United States.
Commerce and Navigation (TFCN) between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the United States provides that "companies constituted
under the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of
either Party shall be deemed companies thereof and shall have their
juridical status recognized within the territories of the other
140
Party."
To be sure, it is not entirely clear whether the TFCN can be read
as embracing the state of incorporation doctrine. There are two main
considerations that may undermine such an assumption. First, what
the duty to "recognize" the "judicial status" of the foreign corporation
entails is controversial. Basically, three views can be distinguished
Some commentators believe that the relevant
in this context.
provision only refers to the question of who enjoys the various rights
accorded by the TFCN and is without relevance to the corporate
conflict of laws. 141 Others believe that the TFCN prescribes the state
of incorporation doctrine, but only with regard to the recognition of
the legal personalities of foreign corporations. 1 42 Under that view, a

See, e.g., Carsten Thomas Ebenroth & Achim Sura, Das Problem der
138.
Anerkennung im InternationalenGesellschaftsrecht - Feststellung der Rechtsfahigkeit
und Bestimmung des Personalstatuts [The Problem of Recognition the Conflict of Law
Rules Regarding Corporations- Confirmation of Legal Capacity and Determination of

Personal Statute],

43 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALS

Gerfried Fischer, Haftung ffir
PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 315, 317 (1979);
Scheinauslandsgesellschaften(zu LG Stuttgart, 31.7.1989 - 7 0 64/89) [The Liability
for Debts of Pseudo.ForeignCorporations(A Comment on LG Stuttgart 31.7.1989 - 7 0
64/89)], 11 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS [IPRAX] 100, 101 (1991) (on
file with author).
139.
See sources cited supra note 144.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, U.S.140.
F.R.G., 7 U.S.T. 1839, art. 25.
141.

See, e.g., GERHARD KEGEL, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 427 (7th ed.

1995) (on file with author); Berndt, supra note 132, at 190-91.
See, e.g., Werner F. Ebke, Unternehmensrecht und Binnenmarkt-E
142.
pluribus unum? [The Law of the Enterprise and the Internal Market-E Pluribus
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corporation formed in the United States will be recognized as a legal
person in Germany, but as long as its real seat is in Germany,
German law will apply to its internal affairs. 143 Finally, it has been
argued that the TFCN completely embraces the state of incorporation
doctrine with regard to U.S. corporations (i.e., that the Contracting
States are bound to apply the corporate law of the jurisdiction where
144
the relevant organization was formed).

The second obstacle also comes in the guise of a narrow
Some voices have
interpretation of Article XXV of the TFCN.

suggested that despite the TFCN's wording, a "genuine link" has to

145
exist between the state of incorporation and the corporation itself.

The mere fact that a corporation is incorporated in a Contracting
State and may have a mailbox address in that state, they argue,
146
cannot suffice for the application of Article XXV.

Unum?], 62 RABELS ZEITBCHRIFT FOR AUBLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALS
PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 195, 211 (1998) (noting that the relevant treaty provision does

not replace the real seat rule as a whole); see also Bernhard Grolfeld & Susanne
Erlinghagen, Internationales Unternehmensrecht und deutsche unternehmerische
Mitbestimmung [International Corporate Law and German Codetermination], 48
JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 217, 224-25 (1993) (on file with author) (arguing that the TFCN
prescribes at most the internal affairs doctrine with regard to the legal capacity of
corporations but leaving open the possibility that the TFCN does not concern conflict of
laws questions at all).
143.
See sources cited supranote 148.
Bippus,
Die
144.
See, e.g.,
Carsten
Thomas
Ebenroth
& Birgit
Anerkennungsproblematik im Internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht [The Problem of
Recognition in International Corporate Law], 41 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
[NJW] 2137, 2142 (1988); Carsten Thomas Ebenroth & Thomas J. Dillon, Gaining the
Competitive Edge: Access to the European Market Through Bilateral Commercial
Treaties and Taxation Strategies, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 269, 283 (1993) (noting that
German courts must apply U.S. law to the internal affairs of U.S. corporations); WulfHenning Roth, Der Einflu
des Europdischen Gemeinschaftsrechts auf das
Internationale Privatrecht [The Influence of European Community Law on the Rules
Governing the Conflict of Laws], 55 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND
INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 623, 651 (1991) (stressing in particular that

Art. 25 of the TFCN allows German firms to avoid the rules on codetermination);
Susan Wessels & Hans-Jorg Ziegenhain, Sitz und Griundungstheorie im
internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht [Real Seat Doctrine and State of Incorporation
Doctrine in International Corporate Law], 77 GMBH-RUNDSCHAU [GMBHR] 423, 431

(1988) (on file with author); see also Hartwin Bungert, Rechtsfdhigkeit USamerikanischer Kapitalgesellschaften ohne geschdftlichen Schwerpunkt in den USA
[Legal Capacity of U.S. Corporations without an Effective Place of Management in the
USA], 49 WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN

[wM] 2125, 2131 (1995) (on file with author)

(suggesting that a U.S. corporation's internal affairs are governed by U.S. corporate
law, but defining the concept of internal affairs narrowly so as to exclude, for example,
rules on legal representation).
145.
Cf. Berndt, supra note 132, at 190-91.
146.
OLG Dtisseldorf, Urt. v. 15.12.1994, 16 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN
ZIVIL- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS [IPRAX] 130-31 (1996); Carsten Thomas Ebenroth et
al., Die Auswirkungen des genuine.link-Grundsatzes auf die Anerkennung USin
Deutschland,
16
ZEITSCHRIFT
FVR
amerikanischer
Gesellschaften
WIRTSCHAFrSRECHT 972, 974 n.24 (1995) (on file with author); Carsten Thomas
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This said, the two above-mentioned attempts at a restrictive
interpretation of the TFCN are insufficient to explain why German
firms have not even attempted to use the relevant treaty provision as
a means of incorporating under U.S. corporate law. That is because
the highest
German
court in
civil
law
matters,
the
Bundesgerichtshof, has never adopted the restrictive interpretations
suggested above.
Consider first, the issue of whether the TFCN deals with the
question of which corporate law regime is to apply. The most
restrictive view-namely, the position that the TFCN does not relate
to the conflict of laws at all, has sometimes been adopted by lower
courts. 14 7 But when it finally reached the Bundesgerichtshof in 2003,
it was flatly rejected. 148 The Bundesgerichtshof did not, in that
decision, address the question of whether the TFCN prescribes the
state of incorporation doctrine with regard to all other matters as
well.
While that question has sometimes been answered in a
negative fashion by lower courts, 149 the Bundesgerichtshof might well
come to a different conclusion.
Similarly, the Bundesgerichtshof has never addressed the
question of whether the TFCN applies only to those foreign
corporations that have a genuine link with the state of incorporation.
At least two lower courts have taken this view, 150 but they have
15 1
received sharp criticism in the legal literature.

Ebenroth & Birgit Bippus, Die staatsvertragliche Anerkennung auslandischer
Gesellschaften in Abkehr von der Sitztheorie [The Bilateral Recognition of Foreign
Corporations in Departure from the Real Seat Doctrine], 41 DER BETRIEB 842, 845
(1988); Carsten Thomas Ebenroth & Andreas Willburger, Kurzkommentar zu OLG
Dusseldorf EWiR § 11 GmbHG 1/95, 583 [A Brief Comment on OLG DiisseldorfEWiR §
11 GmbHG 1/95, 583], 11 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN ZUM WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [EWIR] § 11
GMBHG 583, 584 (1995) (on file with author).
147.
See OLG Hamm, GMBH-RUNDSCHAU 302 (2003); OLG Disseldorf, Urt. v.
1.10.1997 - 15 U 173/96, juris.

148.
See BGH, 57 WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNGEN [WM] 699, 700 (2003).
149.
See LG Hagen, 3 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS [IPRAx] 35,
36 (1983). By contrast, the OLG Naumburg seems to assume that art. 25 of the TFCN
imposes the state of incorporation doctrine both with regard to a corporation's legal
capacity and with regard to all other internal matters. See OLG Naumburig, Urt. v.
19.12.1995 - 7 U 146/95, juris, IIl.b.
150.
OLG Disseldorf, Urt. v. 15.12.1994, 16 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN
ZWIL- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS [IPRAx] 130-31 (1996); OLG Naumburg, Urt. v.
19.12.1995 - 7 U 146/95, juris, 11.2.
151.
See, e.g., Hartwin Bungert, Sitzankndpfung fir Rechtsfahigkeit von
Gesellschaften gilt auch nicht mehr im Verhiltnis zu den USA [Real Seat Rule Does Not
Govern the Legal Capacity of Corporations in Relation to the USA Either], 37 DER
BETRIEB [DB] 1043, 1044 (2003) (on file with author); Michael J. Ulmer, Die
Anerkennung US-amerikanischer Gesellschaften in Deutschland [The Recognition of
U.S. Corporations in Germany], 16 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN ZrVIL- UND
VERFAHRENSRECHTS [IPRAx] 100, 103 (1996) (on file with author); Wessels &
Ziegenhain, supra note 144, at 431.
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Against that background, any attempt to explain the lack of a
transatlantic charter market between Germany and the United
States on the basis of the real seat rule must fail. If the real seat
doctrine were the decisive obstacle for German corporations wishing
to incorporate in the United States, then surely one could have
expected the relevant legal issues to be clearly resolved by now.

B. The Inability to Reincorporate
One could also argue that the unwillingness of German firms to
incorporate in the United States is due to the inability to
reincorporate between the two countries: at present, German law
15 2
does not allow mergers between German and foreign corporations.
Neither does German law allow domestic corporations to transfer
their statutory seat to another jurisdiction, while retaining their real
seat in Germany. 153 Similarly, while German law does not prevent
foreign corporations from transferring their statutory seat to
Germany, 15 4 the German legal system will not. recognize them as
German corporations unless they are newly formed. 155 As a result,
foreign corporations cannot reincorporate in Germany, and German
corporations cannot reincorporate abroad. In both cases, of course, a
new corporation can be formed in the desired jurisdiction. But given
the lack of rules allowing for transnational mergers, the firm's hidden
156
assets would be subject to taxation.
This Article expresses no doubt about the importance of these
rules, but the inability to migrate from Germany to the United States
or vice versa cannot explain the complete unwillingness of German
firms to incorporate in the United States. After all, if the abovedescribed drawbacks of the state of incorporation rule are

152.
That is true regardless of whether the surviving corporation is to be the
German or the foreign one. See, e.g., Kronke, supra note 128, at 36; Maier-Reimer,
19. A few scholars hold a different view vis-A-vis intrasupra note 128, at 1216,
European mergers. See, e.g., Marcus Lutter, UmstrukturierungVon Unternhemen uber
die Grenze: Versuch eines Resumes [Cross-borderCorporate Restructuring: Attempt at a
Summary], 23 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR]

87, 91 (1994) (suggesting, with a view to the Freedom of Establishment, that German
law should be interpreted in such a way as to allow cross-border mergers).
See, e.g., BGHZ 29, 320 (328); BGHZ 19, 102 (105); OLG Hamm, 13 NEUE
153.
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIr-RECHTSPRECHUNGSREPORT [NJW-RR] 615, 615 (1998).
See, e.g., STEIGER, supra note 124, at 53.
154.
155.

See, e.g., id.; BRUHN, supra note 127, at 35.

That consequence occurs regardless of whether a German corporation
156.
decides to reincorporate in the United States or whether a U.S. corporation decides to
reincorporate in Germany. As long as the corporation to be dissolved has been
operating its business in Germany and has therefore been taxed in Germany on its
worldwide profits, any liquidation of the corporation will lead to the corporation's
hidden assets being taxed. This is true regardless of the nationality of the corporation.
See § 11 Krperschaftsteuergesetz, v. 3.21.1991 (BGB1. I, S.831).
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disregarded, the risks that result from having to remain incorporated
in the United States are limited. In particular, corporations need not
fear that the U.S. jurisdiction they have chosen will make use of their
inability to reincorporate in Germany in order to exploit them. Apart
from the fact that such a course of action would be highly damaging
to the reputation of the relevant jurisdiction in the market for
corporate charters, the corporations at issue could always
reincorporate in another U.S. jurisdiction. Moreover, there is another
reason to believe that the inability to return to the real seat state at a
later point is not behind the unwillingness of German-based firms to
incorporate in the United States: the same obstacle exists between
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, 15 7 yet that fact has not
deterred Dutch firms from forming U.K. companies in large
numbers. 158 Further, not all corporations have or expect to have
hidden reserves that might prevent them from reincorporating in
another jurisdiction at low cost.

157.
Neither U.K. nor Dutch law allows corporations to transfer their statutory
seat to another jurisdiction. With regard to Dutch law, see Levinus Timmerman,

Sitzverlegung von Kapitalgesellschaftennach niederldndischem Recht und die 14. EURichlinie [The Transfer of the CorporateSeat under Dutch Law and the 14th Directive],
28 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 147, 152-53
(1999) (on file with author). Only in cases of emergencies, such as wars or revolutions,
are Dutch corporations allowed to transfer their statutory seat to another state. See id.
at 154. It should also be noted that Dutch law does not allow foreign corporations to
enter into the scope of application of Dutch corporate law by transferring their
statutory seat to the Netherlands. Id.
Moreover, U.K. company law does not allow corporations to transfer their statutory
seat to another jurisdiction either. See, e.g., Todd v. Egyptian Land and Investment
Co., [1228] 1 K.B. 152, 173; Gasque v. I.R.C., [1940] 2 K.B. 80, 84; Carl Zeiss Stiftung v.
Rayner & Keeler & others (No. 3), [1970] 1 Ch. 506, 544; J.G. COLLIER, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 61 (2nd ed. 1994); DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1104 (Lawrence
Collins ed., 12th ed. 1993); ALBERT FARNSWORTH, THE RESIDENCE AND DOMICIL OF
CORPORATIONS 230 (1939); P.M. NORTH & J. J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE & NORTH'S PRIVATE

INTERNATIONAL LAW 174 (12th ed. 1992).
In addition, mergers between U.K. companies and Dutch companies do not seem to
be a realistic option. To be sure, U.K. law has been interpreted by some to allow crossborder mergers. See GILLESSEN, supra note 125, at 385. But the courts do not seem to
have decided on the admissibility of such a merger. See id. Moreover, Dutch law
expressly prohibits cross-border mergers with foreign corporations. See Timmermann,
supra, at 155.
158.
See EvA-MARIA KIENINGER, WETTBEWERB DER PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNGEN
IM EUROPAISCHEN BINNENMARKT 198 (2002) (on file with author) (noting that the

Netherlands was forced to restrict the state of incorporation doctrine because of the
"massiven Abwanderung inlindischer kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen in
auslndische Rechtsformen, insbesondere die der englischen company limited. ...
[massive migration of small and medium-size businesses toward foreign organizational
forms, particularly toward that of the English company limited .... ]").
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C. The Demand for U.S. CorporateLaw
Finally, one could claim that there is simply no demand for U.S.
corporate law among German firms, because they can turn to U.K.
company law instead. Indeed, today that reasoning has considerable
weight. Given Centros, incorporation in the United Kingdom is a far
more reliable way of avoiding the German rules on minimum capital
requirements and codetermination than incorporation in the United
States can be. But it should be noted that the Centros decision was
only adopted in 1999.159 Before that, incorporation in the United
Kingdom was not an option for German firms, given that no treaty
between Germany and the United Kingdom has ever required the
application of the state of incorporation doctrine. 160 In fact, the only
other such treaty was concluded with Spain. 161 Yet no reports of
German corporations migrating to Spain to avoid German law have
Hence, to the extent that German firms were
ever surfaced.
interested in a more flexible corporate law, one would have expected
them to incorporate in the United States rather than in the United
Kingdom.
In sum, therefore, one has to conclude that the shortcomings of
the state of incorporation doctrine truly matter, as far as the
There may be other
transatlantic charter market is concerned.
factors that contribute to the unwillingness of European and U.S.
firms to incorporate in a jurisdiction on the other side of the Atlantic.
But these other obstacles are per se insufficient to explain the lack of
a transatlantic charter market. Rather, one can only conclude that
the inexistence of a transatlantic charter market is largely the
consequence of the various shortcomings of the state of incorporation
doctrine.

V. POTENTIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PRESENT SYSTEM

So far, this Article has shown that the state of incorporation
doctrine possesses a number of drawbacks that may discourage
corporations from choosing the corporate law they find most efficient.
First, the doctrine exposes corporations to the risk of litigation in the
state of incorporation. Second, it forces European firms willing to

See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999
159.
E.C.R. 1-1459, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551 (1999).
160.
See, e.g., Ebenroth et al., supra note 146, at 974-75; Brigitte Knobbe-Keuk,
Umzug von Gesellschaften in Europa [Migration of Companies in Europe], 154
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFrSRECHT [ZHR] 325, 330
(1990) (on file with author).
Id.
161.
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incorporate in the United States to accept the application of U.S.
securities law. Finally, in the transatlantic charter market, it may
burden corporations willing to choose another state's law with
adverse consequences in the field of taxation. Moreover, it has been
shown that these drawbacks really matter, at least in the
transatlantic context.
But that does not necessarily prove that
retaining the state of incorporation doctrine as the only mechanism
for exercising free choice is on the whole inefficient. Rather, the
question remains whether there are any advantages to such a course
of action that make up for the above-described shortcomings.
A. Transparency
In this context, one may first point to the issue of transparency.
The state of incorporation doctrine, it seems, makes it particularly
simple for potential shareholders, third parties, and courts to identify
the applicable state law. 162 That same degree of transparency could
not be attained, one could argue, if corporations were able to
determine the applicable state law in their articles of incorporation.
But that line of reasoning does not carry far. With regard to potential
investors, the alleged gains in transparency can be minimal at best.
After all, capital markets should not find it substantially more
difficult to take notice of an express choice-of-law provision in the
articles of incorporation than to consider the question of where a
corporation is incorporated. Courts, too, will not be substantially

162.
It should be noted, in this context, that the transparency argument is
typically advanced against the state of incorporation rule when the latter is compared
to the real seat rule: Under the real seat rule, a third party creditor knows which
corporate law regime governs a corporation's internal affairs. Under the state of
incorporation rule, by contrast, third party creditors are put at a disadvantage because
they may not know where the corporation is incorporated, and even if they do, they
may not be familiar with the law of that jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wulf-Henning Roth,
From Centros to Uberseering: Free Movement of Companies, PrivateInternationalLaw,
and Community Law, 52 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 177, 202-03 (2003) (defending the real
seat doctrine on the grounds that it lowers the information costs that third parties face
in becoming informed regarding the legal rules governing the corporation). That
reasoning, however, is just as unpersuasive as the argument presented and criticized
in the text. The state of incorporation is easy to ascertain. Hence, to the extent that
the corporation's business partners face additional information costs in dealing with
foreign corporations, they can demand adequate compensation or-more realisticallyrefuse to deal with the corporation in question. Only involuntary creditors may need
additional protection. That problem, however, can be solved more easily and more
effectively by ensuring that the rules governing the rights of tort victims are not
subject to free choice in the first place. Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879,
1921-23 (1991) (arguing that "any state should be able to adopt unlimited shareholder
liability for corporate torts ... for application to any tort claim to which the state's tort
law applies, regardless of the state of incorporation of the corporate defendant").
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burdened by the need to take account of the content of the articles of
incorporation.
That leaves the situation of third party creditors. For practical
reasons, such as the relative unimportance of their transactions with
the corporation, some of these creditors will not be willing or able to
consult the corporation's articles of incorporation ex ante. Such
parties, one could argue, are the true victims of the statutory regime
Again, however, the argument is
suggested in this Article.
unpersuasive. To the extent that corporate law provisions are default
norms, any information about the state of incorporation proves
useless to those parties who cannot or will not consult the articles of
incorporation before contracting with the corporation. It is only with
regard to mandatory corporate law rules that the state of
incorporation doctrine can be expected to increase transparency for
third parties who are unaware of the content of a corporation's
articles of incorporation. Admittedly, this finding does not, per se,
eliminate the relevance of the transparency issue. As opposed to its
U.S. counterpart, 163 European corporate law often relies heavily on
mandatory norms in order to ensure the protection of third parties.
For example, provisions on minimum capital requirements 16 4 or
provisions on codetermination 16 5 fall into this category. As long as
the state of incorporation doctrine is the only mechanism for
exercising free choice in corporate law, one could argue, third parties
can easily judge the applicability of such mandatory provisions by
determining where the corporation is incorporated.
Nevertheless, the transparency argument suffers from a decisive
flaw. A corporation's statutory seat will only be evident to third
parties unable to consult the articles of incorporation if a corporation
is, by law, required to disclose its state of incorporation. By the same
force a corporation to disclose
measure, however, it is possible to 166
which law governs its internal affairs.

Cf., e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and
163.
Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) [hereinafter Black, Is Corporate
Law Trivial?] (noting that corporate law regimes in the U.S. primarily rely on enabling
rather than mandatory norms).
critical assessment-of minimum capital
164.
For an overview-and
requirements under European law, see Luca Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Creditors
Versus Capital Formation: The Case Against the European Legal Capital Rules, 86
CORNELLL. REV. 1165, 1174-1204 (2001).

165.
Several Member States, including Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Luxembourg, and Sweden, have adopted statutes that govern codetermination for
employees on supervisory and management boards. See Elmar Gerum & Helmut
Wagner, Economics of Labor Co-Determination in View of Corporate Governance, in
COMPARATIVE

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING

RESEARCH 341, 352 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998).
166.
Cf. Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 45, at 2362 (suggesting that
corporations should be allowed to choose the applicable securities law and that they
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To be sure, this reasoning still leaves those creditors
unprotected, who cannot, for practical reasons, take into account the
other party's organizational form. 167 But such "involuntary creditors"
would be equally vulnerable if a corporation chose the applicable law
by incorporating in another jurisdiction. Indeed, the only way to
protect involuntary creditors is that suggested by Henry Hansmann
and Reinier Kraakman-namely, to make sure that free choice does
not extend to the rules governing the rights of involuntary creditors
in the first place. 16 8
B. Slippery Slope
One might also argue that the statutory approach to free choice
threatens to lead down a slippery slope toward ever more federal
rules in the field of corporate law. 16 9 Only by retaining the state of
incorporation doctrine as the only mechanism for free choice, one
could argue, can that danger be avoided. Yet whatever merits the
slippery slope argument may or may not have in other contexts, 170 it
does not hold with regard to the issue at hand. To begin with, there
is little reason to believe that the statute suggested in this Article
creates incentives or opportunities for further intervention. No
federal agency is created that might seek to extend its influence by

should be obliged to disclose their securities domicile at the time of initial public
offerings).
167.
It has long been recognized that certain types of contractual creditors have
to be regarded as involuntary rather than voluntary creditors, precisely because they
cannot, for various reasons, protect their own interests by demanding bargains that
fully reflect the costs and benefits they incur in entering into the transaction. See, e.g.,
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 162 (describing the "critical question" to be
"whether the victim was able, prior to the injury, to assess the risks she took in dealing
with the firm and to decline to deal if those risks seemed excessive in comparison with
the net advantages she otherwise derived from the transaction").
168.
Cf. id. at 1921-23 (arguing that "any state should be able to adopt
unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts ... for application to any tort claim to
which the state's tort law applies, regardless of the state of incorporation of the
corporate defendant").
169.
Arguments of this type are by no means uncommon in the field of charter
competition. For example, Bebchuck & Ferrell, New Approach, supra note 8, at 115,
143-61, recently suggested that the federal legislator adopt an optional federal
takeover statute.
Critics of this approach have objected that once a federal
antitakeover statute is in place, even if it has a default character, there is an increased
risk of federal intervention in the future. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T.
Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961, 977
(2001) [hereinafter Choi & Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention] (pointing out the
risk that "a federal agency will eventually increase the scope of its laws and, perhaps,
make them mandatory").
170.
For a general assessment of the value of slippery-slope arguments, see Eric
Lode, Comment, Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1469
(1999).
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pushing for more intervention. 17 1 Also, nothing in this Article
suggests that corporations should be able to incorporate directly
under a federal statute, a move that might indeed prompt more
aggressive federal intervention motivated by the desire to gain a lead
in the market for corporate charters. 172 Of course, one could still
argue that any federal intervention in the field of corporate law
threatens to lead down a slippery slope, because existing political
barriers to federal intervention are breached and hence destabilized.
But that argument can at best apply if a political consensus against
federal interventions exists, a consensus that would be undermined
by the decision to adopt the statutory approach to free choice. Such a
consensus, however, exists neither in the United States nor in
Europe. In the European Community, there has long been a drive
toward an ever-increasing harmonization of corporate law. Many
areas-for example, the law governing mergers between domestic
corporations 173 and minimal capital requirements 1 74-have already
Others-such as the corporate law rules
been harmonized. 175
governing cross-border mergers-are likely to follow. The fear,
therefore, that the statute might make future interventions more
likely seems unfounded. Even in the United States there is no firm
consensus against federal intervention in corporate law. Rather, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002176 suggests that the federal legislator can
invade the area of substantive corporate law with political
177
impunity.
C. The Need for a ConstitutionalBasis
In defense of retaining the state of incorporation doctrine as the
only mechanism for exercising free choice in corporate law, one could

171.
See, e.g., Choi & Guzman, Choice and FederalIntervention, supra note 169,
at 977.
172.
See id.
173.
See Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC of 9 October 1978 based on Art. 54
(3) (g) of the Treaty concerning mergers of public limited companies, 1978 O.J. (L 295)
36.
174.
Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordination
of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are
required by member states of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph
of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited liability
companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making
such safeguards equivalent, 1977 O.J. (L 26) 1.
For an overview of existing Community rules in the area of company law,
175.
see VANESSA EDWARDS, EC COMPANY LAw 1-332 (1999).
176.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
177.
See also Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 60034 (2003) (noting a long history of federal intervention into state corporate law,
beginning with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
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also invoke the following pragmatic argument: both in the United
States and in the Community, one could point out, the state of
incorporation doctrine enjoys a certain amount of "constitutional"
protection, being rooted, respectively, in the U.S. Constitution or in
the TEC.
In both cases, one could plausibly conclude that the
constitutional foundation of the state of incorporation doctrine is far
from deeply entrenched. In the United States, the Supreme Court
has never claimed outright that the state of incorporation doctrine is
mandated by the U.S. Constitution.17 8 Rather, the Court has only
relied on the state of incorporation doctrine in its reasoning, 179 which
may or may not indicate that it considers the doctrine to be rooted in
the U.S. Constitution.1 80 The Delaware Supreme Court has been
more explicit, stressing that the application of the internal affairs
doctrine is mandated by constitutional principles.18 1 But it is far from
clear whether that same conclusion would necessarily be reached by
other courts.18 2 The legal literature has questioned the constitutional
foundation of the state of incorporation doctrine.1 8 3 It should also be
pointed out that Delaware's courts, in asserting the constitutional

178.
See, e.g., Note, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justificationsand
Tentative Explanations for Its Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480, 1490-96
(2002) [hereinafter The Internal Affairs Doctrine].
179.
In Edgar v. MITE Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court addressed on the Illinois
Business Take-Over Act, which limited the ability of foreign corporations to acquire
corporations that had certain defined contacts with Illinois. 457 U.S 624, 645-46 (1981),
The Court found a violation of the Commerce Clause, noting that "Illinois has no
interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations." Id. In CTS Corp. v.
GeneralDynamics Corp. ofAmerica, the Court relied on the internal affairs doctrine in
an even more indirect fashion. 481 U.S. 69 (1987). "So long as each State regulates
voting rights only in the corporations it has created," the Court pointed out, "each
corporation will be subject to the law of only one State." Id. at 89.
180.
Cf. Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the
Internal Affairs Doctrine in CorporationLaw, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29, 34-35 (1987) (noting
that "the CTS Court comes dangerously close to embedding . . . the 'state of
incorporation' version of the internal affairs doctrine-in the Constitution"); P. John
Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1, 41 (arguing that MITE
should not be read as constitutionalizing the lex incorporationis).
181.
McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 217 (Del. 1987); see also id. at 216
(claiming that the internal affairs doctrine is "of serious constitutional proportionsunder due process, the commerce clause and the full faith and credit clause"); Draper v.
Paul N. Gardner Defined Plan Trust, 625 A.2d 859, 866 (Del. 1993) (quoting
McDermott).
182.
It should be noted, in this context, that California's judiciary has not
objected to the application of California law to the internal affairs of pseudo-foreign
corporations. See Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Res., Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 216, 222-31
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming the constitutionality of California's pseudo-foreign
corporation statute).
183.
See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 180, at 35 (arguing that the "constitutional
'Delawarization' of state corporation law is not what CTS intends or effects"); The
InternalAffairs Doctrine, supra note 178, at 1490-96 (arguing that the internal affairs
rule is not, as a whole, constitutionally mandated).
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nature of the state of incorporation doctrine, may not have been
completely unbiased.18 4 After all, Delaware is the state that profits
most from the application of the internal affairs rule. 185 Similarly,
the "constitutional" foundation of the state of incorporation in the
Community is by no means written in stone. The Court's move
toward the state of incorporation doctrine started only with the
Centros decision in 1999.186 Before that, the leading case on the real
seat rule, the famous Daily Mail decision, 8 7 was understood by many
to endorse the real seat rule. 8 8 Moreover, the reasoning underlying
The claim that the Delaware judiciary is influenced by the desire to
184.
maximize Delaware's income from the charter market was famously raised by Cary in
his philippic against Delaware law. See Cary, supra note 4, at 692 (suggesting that
"Delaware may be characterized as a tight little club" and claiming that "participation
in state politics and in the leading firms inevitably would align the Delaware judiciary
solidly with Delaware legislative policy"). That reasoning is not altogether convincing.
One cannot assume that Delaware judges will generally be willing to put the pecuniary
interests of Delaware, let alone those of its corporate bar, above the interests of
shareholders. This said, it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that Delaware's
judges will be swayed by the interests of their state, when they believe the latter to be
in line with the interests of shareholders. In fact, may well be the case in the context
at hand. As Macey and Miller have pointed out, Delaware's judges are likely to
"believe strongly in the efficacy of the Delaware legal system." See Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware CorporationLaw, 65
TEX. L. REV. 469, 502 (1987) [hereinafter Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory]. Accordingly, Delaware judges are also likely to believe that the foundation of
Delaware's success in the charter market, the internal affairs rule, benefits
shareholders.
See, e.g., The InternalAffairs Doctrine,supra note 178, at 1481.
185.
See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabstyrelsen, 1999
186.
E.C.R. 1-1459, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551 (1999).
Case C-81187, Queen v. HM Treasury & Commissioners of Inland Revenue
187.
ex parte Daily Mail & General Trust plc, 1988 E.C.R. 5483, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 713
(1988).
See, e.g., Peter Behrens, Das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht nach dem
188.
Centros-Urteil des EuGH, 19 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS [IPRAX]
323, 322 (1999) (on file with author) (stating that Daily Mail suggested that the Court
of Justice did not consider the real seat rule in violation of the Freedom of
Establishment); Bernhard Grolfeld, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht [Corporate
Conflict of Laws], in J. VON STAUDINGERS KOMMENTAR ZUM BURGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH MIT EINFtJHRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN 122 (Christian von Bar
et al. eds., 1998) (on file with author) (citing the Daily Mail decision as evidence that
the Court of Justice considered the real seat doctrine to be compatible with the
Freedom of Establishment); Otto Sandrock, Centros: Ein Etappensieg far die
Uberlagerungstheorie[Centros: A Stage Victory for the Theory of Superimposement], 54
BETRIEBSBERATER [BB] 1337, 1337 (1999) (on file with author) (claiming that the Daily
Mail decision recognized the legality of the real seat rule); Clark D. Stith, Note,
Federalismand Company Law: A "Race to the Bottom" in the European Communities,
79 GEO. L.J. 1581, 1603 (1991) (claiming that the Court addressed the issue of the real
seat rule in deciding Daily Mail); cf. Ulrich Forsthoff, Niederlassungsrecht fir
Kapitalgesellschaften nach dem Centros-Urteil des EuGH: Eine Bilanz [Freedom of
Establishment for Corporations After the Centros-decision of the European Court of
Justice:A Survey], EUROPARECHT [EuR] 167, 180 (2000) (pointing out that many voices
in the literature unjustifiably advanced the Daily Mail decision as proof that the real
seat doctrine was compatible with the Freedom of Establishment).
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the Centros decision has met with sharp criticism in the legal
literature. 8 9 In sum, neither the U.S. Constitution nor the TEC
provides an unshakable foundation for the concept of free choice.
Against this background, one could argue that securing free choice
via statutory law bears a particular risk; from the perspective of the
judiciary, such a statutory solution reduces the necessity of finding a
constitutional basis for the state of incorporation doctrine. As a
result, the chance of "constitutionalizing" free choice is missed.
Should the federal legislator experience a change of mind later on,
the state of incorporation doctrine will be far less entrenched than it
could have been, had the legislator not adopted the statutory
approach to free choice.
But there are obvious flaws in this argument. It goes without
saying that a lack of trust in the efficiency of a particular legislative
outcome is a somewhat questionable basis for judicial activism.1 90
Even leaving aside democratic concerns, however, the abovedescribed reasoning is unconvincing. To begin with, it should once
again be recalled that this Article does not suggest eliminating the
state of incorporation doctrine. Consequently, cases involving the
state of incorporation doctrine will continue to face the courts, even if
the statutory approach suggested in this Article is adopted.
Moreover, even if the state of incorporation doctrine was retained as
the sole mechanism for exercising free choice, it is by no means clear
that its retention would enhance its constitutional protection. In the
United States, the application of the state of incorporation doctrine
does not, as a rule, make it necessary to invoke the Commerce Clause
or any other provision of the U.S. Constitution. After all, courts have
employed the state of incorporation doctrine long before the Supreme
Court hinted, in CTS Corp. v. General Dynamics,191 that it might be
rooted in constitutional law. 1 92
At best, therefore, the abovedescribed reasoning might apply to the European Community, where
the state of incorporation doctrine has been imposed by declaring
state law to be in violation of the Freedom of Establishment. 1 93 Even
in the European context, however, it seems questionable whether

189.
Cf., e.g., KIENINGER, supra note 158, at 142-46 (summarizing the doctrinal
critique directed against Centros).
190.
Cf. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 67 (1991) (pointing out that "an expansion of
judicial review requires more than a demonstration that the political process often
produces defective outcomes," because "we have no guarantee that judges empowered
to review laws will only strike down . . . undesirable political outcomes; their review
may also produce . . . undesirable political outcomes and strike down . . . desirable

political outcomes").
191.
481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
192.
See, e.g., Wilkins v. Thorne, 60 Md. 253, 258 (Md. 1883) (applying the state
of incorporation doctrine).
193.
See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
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retaining the state of incorporation doctrine as the only mechanism
to the
free
choice will truly contribute
for exercising
constitutionalization of free choice. In particular, it is far from clear
whether, and to what extent, the European Court of Justice will
continue to preclude the Member States from applying their own
corporate law to pseudo-foreign corporations. After all, both in
Centros and Uberseering,the Court has indicated that the states may
still be able to impose their own corporate law rules if such a course
of conduct is necessary to protect stakeholders such as employees or
third-party creditors. 19 4 Against this background, any attempt to
reinforce the constitutional basis of the state of incorporation doctrine
in Europe by relying on the Court of Justice to implement that
doctrine may well backfire. The Court, anxious not to overstep the
limits of legitimate judicial review, 195 may decide on a generous
approach vis-A-vis the power of the Member States to apply their own
corporate law. By contrast, creating a statutory foundation for free
choice may well stabilize that concept. After all, such a move will
increase legal certainty for corporations and hence prompt more
European corporations to choose another Member State's corporate
law. Once a significant number of corporations are governed by
foreign law, however, any attempt by a Member State to reintroduce
the real seat rule will burden the local economy with considerable
transition costs. Hence, creating the statutory regime suggested in
this Article may well be the approach most likely to guarantee the
survival of free choice in the long run.

194.
See Case C-208/00, Uberseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement
GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919,
92 ("It is not inconceivable that overriding
requirements relating to the general interest, such as the protection of the interests of
creditors, minority shareholders, employees and even the taxation authorities, may, in
certain circumstances and subject to certain conditions, justify restrictions on freedom
of establishment."); Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v Erhvervs-og Selskabstyrelsen, 1999
E.C.R. 1-1459,
34, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551, 586 (1999) (noting that national measures
restricting the fundamental freedoms are compatible with the Treaty if they are
applied in a non-discriminatory manner, justified by imperative requirements in the
general interest, suitable for securing the attainment of the objective that they pursue,
and if they do not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it); cf. Case C-167/01,
Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 24
133 (2003) (noting that national
ZEITSCHRIT FIR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 1885,
measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms
guaranteed by the Treaty must, if they are to be justified, fulfill four conditions: they
must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative
requirements in the public interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment
of the objective that they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in
order to attain it).
195
It should be noted, in this context, that the European Community has long
been under fire for allegedly suffering from a "democracy deficit." Cf., e.g., J. H. H.
Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2466-74 (1991)
(summarizing concerns that the actions of the Community's organs such as the Council
and the Commission are not subject to sufficient democratic control).
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VI. WHY DID WE END UP WITH THE STATE OF INCORPORATION
DOCTRINE AS THE ONLY MECHANISM FOR EXERCISING FREE CHOICE IN
CORPORATE LAW?

A central problem remains. If it is truly efficient to grant
corporations the freedom to choose the applicable law in their articles
of incorporation, why has such a rule not yet been adopted? In
answering that question, one must distinguish between lawmakers
and courts.

A. Why Have Lawmakers Failedto Adopt the Approach Discussed in
this Article?
It is fairly easy to see why legislators have not adopted the
statutory approach to free choice suggested in this Article. In a
nutshell, lawmakers at both the federal and the state level will not
generally be thrilled at the idea of free choice in the first place.
Hence, it is unlikely that they will search for ways to increase
corporate mobility.
First, consider the incentives that state legislators face. In any
federal system adhering to the concept of free choice, there is a
certain probability that corporations will concentrate on one or a few
jurisdictions. After all, some jurisdictions will usually offer more
attractive substantive rules and a better court system than others.
Moreover, once a jurisdiction is the legal home to a disproportionate
number of corporations, that jurisdiction will also profit from positive
network externalities 196 including, in particular, a large body of
precedent 197 and judges experienced in the application of corporate
law norms. 198 If corporations concentrate on one or a few states,
however, most jurisdictions will end up losing corporate charters.
Correspondingly, the lawmakers of those states are bound to lose
some of their influence. They can hardly be expected, therefore, to
call for an increase in corporate mobility. That does not mean, of
course, that they will necessarily call for restrictions to free choice.
Especially in those cases where free choice has already been
established by courts, lawmakers may be unwilling to incur the wrath
of local enterprises by putting an end to that system. But they hardly
have an incentive to call for more of the same either. Moreover, even

196.
Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 842-47 (1995) (describing network benefits enjoyed by
corporations incorporated in popular states of incorporation).
197.
Id. (categorizing such benefits as "interpretative network externalities").
198.
Id. To be sure, the fact that the expertise of Delaware's judges can be
attributed to specialization has been known long before the concept of network effects
was explicitly introduced into the debate on charter competition. See, e.g., Black, Is
CorporateLaw Trivial?, supra note 163, at 589-90.
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states such as Delaware that attract a, disproportionate number of
corporate charters are unlikely to call for a federal rule of the type
suggested in this Article. After all, under such a statutory approach
to free choice, the ability of the relevant states to collect franchise
taxes can only be secured by federal intervention; federal law must
ensure that corporations pay franchise taxes to those states whose
law is declared applicable in the articles of incorporation. Whether
such a rule would be the outcome of the federal legislative process,
however, is hardly foreseeable. Hence, states profiting from the
charter market will rationally decide not to risk the goose that lays
golden eggs by calling for a statutory approach to free choice.
At first glance, the federal legislator might be more interested in
furthering free choice. After all, as long as corporations do not
incorporate at the federal level, the federal legislator does not need to
fear losing corporate charters to competing jurisdictions. Yet there
are other factors that may prevent the federal legislator from
adopting the approach suggested in this Article. Regarding the
European Community, it should be noted that legislation can only be
enacted if it is adopted by the Council, 199 where the Member States
are represented. 20 0
Given that most Member States have little
incentive to adopt free choice, the Council-and hence, the
Community legislator-is unlikely to see matters differently. In the
United States, the federal legislative process may seem more
conducive to the enactment of legislation promoting free choice. But
even there, the federal legislator has little reason to adopt a federal
rule that is bound to meet with opposition from practically every state
government.
The above-described theoretical considerations are, at least to
some degree, confirmed by practical experience. To the extent that
U.S. and European lawmakers have interfered with the rules
governing the corporate conflict of laws, it has usually been to
restrict, rather than promote, free choice. This is particularly true in
the European Community.
The real seat doctrine, which has
traditionally prevailed among European jurisdictions, 20 1 was often
introduced, or at least codified, by legislation. 20 2 By contrast, those

199.
See, e.g., T.E.C., supra note 10, at art. 44(1) ("In order to attain Freedom of
Establishment as regards a particular activity, the Council, acting in accordance with
the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the Economic and Social
Committee, shall act by means of directives.").
200.
Id. at art. 203(1) (' The Council shall consist of a representative of each
Member State at ministerial level, authorized to commit the government of that
Member State.").
201.
See sources cited supra note 11.
202.
For example, that has been the case in Belgium, where the legislator
imposed the real seat doctrine in 1873 in order to prevent corporations from evading
Belgian law. See Groffeld, Anerkennungstheorien, supra note 23, at 211-12.
In
Austria, too, the real seat doctrine is explicitly set forth by statute. See § 10
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few Member States that adhere to the state of incorporation doctrine
typically owe that doctrine to the judiciary rather than to statutory
law.2 03 Even the Community legislator has shown his sympathy for
the real seat doctrine. The recently adopted regulation of the socalled European Company, 20 4 an organizational form governed in
part by Community law and in part by state law, explicitly embraces
the real seat rule; Article 7 of the this regulation demands that the
registered office of a European Company, which determines the
applicable state law, must be in the same state as the real seat. 20 5 A
similar approach was taken by the Community legislator with regard
to another organizational form-namely, the so-called European
Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)-which was created by
regulation in 1985.206 According to Article 2(1) of the regulation at
issue, the law applicable to the internal organization of an EEIG shall

Bundesgesetz iber das internationale Privatrecht, v. 15.6.1978 (BGBl. I S.304). Italian
statutory law, too, explicitly provides that corporations having their real seat in Italy
are governed by Italian corporate law. See Art. 25 Legge 31 maggio 1995, no. 218,
Riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale private, Supplemento ordinario
alla Gazzetta Ufficiale del 3 giugnio 1995. Similarly, Spanish statutory law explicitly
provides that the statutory seat of corporations that have their principal place of
business in Spain must be in Spain. See Art. 5(1) Ley de Sociedades An6nimas (R.C.L.
1989, 1564). The same is true in France. See art. 3(1) Loi No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966,
J.O., July 26, 1966, p. 6402; 1966 D.S.L. 265 ("Les soci6t6s dont le si6ge social est situ6
en territoire fran~ais sont soumises Ala loi fran~aise.").
203.
As regards the United Kingdom, see Grofeld, Anerkennungsproblematik,
supra note 22, at 345 (analyzing the judgment that first introduced the state of
incorporation doctrine in the United Kingdom.). The same is true in Austria, where
the courts-spurned by the Centros decision-have only recently chosen to partially
abandon the real seat doctrine in favor of the state of incorporation doctrine. See OGH,
55 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 199, 199 (2000); OGH, 11 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT

[EuZW]

156, 156

(2000).

For a critical

comment on these

decisions, see Werner F. Ebke, Centros-Some Realities and Some Mysteries, 48 AM. J.
COMP. L. 623, 656-57 (2000) (arguing that the Austrian Supreme Court misunderstood
the European Court of Justice's holding in Centros). As regards Denmark, there seems
to have been some uncertainty as to whether the real seat rule or the state of
See KIENINGER, supra note 158, at 119 n.95
incorporation doctrine applied.
(summarizing contradictory statements by various authors). In the end, the decision
seems to have been made by the judiciary in 1998. See Paul Kriiger Andersen &
Engsig Sorensen, Free Movement of Companies from a Nordic Perspective, 6
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. [MJ] 47, 56 (1999). An exception to this rule are the
Netherlands, where the state of incorporation doctrine is explicitly endorsed by
statutory law. See Wet conflictenrecht corporaties, art. 2 (1997) (on file with author).
At the time the Act was adopted, however, the struggle between the real seat doctrine
and the state of incorporation doctrine had long been decided in favor of the latter. See
KIENINGER, supra note 158, at 180. Hence, the Dutch legislator was only codifying the
status quo.
204.
Council Regulation 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company,
2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 [hereinafter SE-Regulation].
205.
Cf. SE-Regulation, supra note 204, art. 7(1) ("The registered office of an SE
shall be located within the Community, in the same Member State as its head office.").
See Council Regulation 2137/85 on the European Economic Interest
206.
Grouping, 1985 O.J. (L 199) 1-4.
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20 7
At
be the law of the state in which the official address is situated.
the same time, however, Article 12(2) provides that "[t]he official
address must be fixed either: (a) where the grouping has its central
administration, or (b) where one of the members of the grouping has
its central administration or, in the case of a natural person, his
principal activity, provided that the grouping carries on an activity
208
there."
In the United States, the situation is more ambiguous. After all,
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act explicitly codifies the
state of incorporation doctrine, 20 9 and many states have followed its
lead. 210 It should be noted, however, that the rule in question did not
change the law when it was first suggested. Rather, it reflected the
then-existing status quo. 211 By contrast, in those cases where state
lawmakers modified the status quo, it was to restrict free choice,
either by means of pseudo-corporation statutes, 212 or-in the case of
the federal legislator-by federalizing corporate law. 213 In sum, both
theoretical considerations and past experience suggest that
lawmakers are unlikely to actively promote free choice. It follows
that lawmakers generally cannot be expected to take measures
facilitating free choice, even if such measures promise efficiency
gains.

B. Why Have Courts Failedto Adopt the Approach Discussed in this
Article?
The question remains, of course, why the courts that adopted the
state of incorporation doctrine did not also grant corporations the
freedom to choose the applicable law in their articles of incorporation.

Id. art. 2(1).
207.
Id. art. 12.
208.
Cf. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 15.05(c) (1984) ('This Act does not authorize
209.
this state to regulate the organizations or internal affairs of a foreign corporation
authorized to transact business in this state.").
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2B-15.05(C) (2003); ALASKA STAT. § 10.20.455 (3)
210.
(2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT.§§ 10-1505(C),10-11505(C) (2003); ARK.CODE ANN. § 4-271505(C) (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-115-105 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-924(C)
(2003); FLA. STAT. ch. 607.1505(3) (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1505 (2003); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 414-435 (C) (2003); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.02 (2003).
211.
U.S. courts had embraced the state of incorporation doctrine far earlier.
See, e.g., Wilkins v. Thorne, 60 Md. 253, 258 (Md. 1883) (embracing the state of
incorporation doctrine with regard to a pseudo-foreign corporation). An analysis of the
historical origin of the internal affairs doctrine is undertaken by Richard M. Buxbaum,
The Origins of the American "InternalAffairs" Rule in the Corporate Conflict of Laws,
in FESTSCHRIFT FUR GERHARD KEGEL ZUM 75. GEBURTSTAG

(H.-J. Musielak & K.

Schurig eds., 1987).
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
212.
LAW § 1320 (McKinney's 1986 & Supp. 2002).
213.
See generally Roe, supra note 177 (providing an overview of federal
incursions in the area of corporate law).
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1. The European Community
With regard to the European Community, that question is
relatively easy to answer. At least two factors explain why the
European Court of Justice has failed to grant corporations the right
to choose the applicable law in their articles of incorporation. Most
important, there are doctrinal reasons to consider. The wording of
the TEC makes it relatively easy to find the real seat doctrine in
violation of the Freedom of Establishment, but it does not give the
slightest hint that corporations might be entitled to choose the
applicable law in their articles of incorporation. Consider, first, the
case for banning the real seat doctrine: TEC Article 43(1)(1) gives
European citizens the right to establish themselves in the territory of
other Member States. 214
TEC Article 48 extends this right to
corporations by providing that "[c]ompanies ...formed in accordance
with the law of a Member State. .. [must] be treated in the same way
''2 5
as natural persons who are nationals of Member States. 1
Obviously, the real seat doctrine can have harsh consequences for a
corporation formed under the law of one Member State, but whose
real seat is established in another. For example, if a U.K. company
moves its headquarters to Germany without reincorporating under
German law, German courts, assuming that they apply the real seat
doctrine, will treat the organization as a partnership, subjecting all
its shareholders to unlimited liability. 2 16 Against this background,
the idea that the real seat doctrine constitutes an obstacle to the
Freedom of Establishment is not particularly difficult to reach from
218
the text of the TEC, 2 17 as even critics of the Centros decision admit.
Indeed, even before Centros, European scholars had long been
discussing the question of whether the real seat rule is compatible
with the law of the European Community.2 19 Consequently, the main

214.
Cf. T.E.C., supra note 10, art. 43(l)(1) ("Within the framework of the
prohibitions set out below, restrictions on the Freedom of Establishment of nationals of
one Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited.").
215.
Id. art. 48.
216.
See, e.g., Ebenroth & Sura, supra note 138, at 317; Fischer, supra note 138,
at 101.
217.
Both in Centros and in Uberseering, the Court's reasoning relied strongly
on the wording of the Treaty. See, e.g., Case C-208/00, U0berseering BV v. Nordic
Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919,
56, 75; Case C212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459,
19, [1999]
2 C.M.L.R. 551, 584 (1999)
218.
See, e.g., KIENINGER, supra note 158, at 143-44.
219.
See,
e.g.,
NIEDERLASSUNGSFREIHEIT

DOMINIK
[THE SCOPE

OF

SCHNICHELS,
APPLICATION

REICHWEITE
DER
OF THE FREEDOM OF

ESTABLISHMENT] 155-99 (1995) (on file with author) (arguing that the real seat doctrine
violates the Freedom of Establishment); Rainer Deville, Anmerkung zum Beschluj6 des
Bayerischen Obersten Landesgerichts vom 18.7.1985-BReg. 3Z 62/85 [A Comment on
the Decision of the Bavarian Supreme Court from July 18, 1985-BReg. 3Z 62/85], 32
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criticism directed against the Centros doctrine is not textualist but,
rather, purposivist in nature: the Freedom of Establishment, some
scholars claim, is intended to allow enterprises to operate a business
to
in another state. 220 By contrast, they argue, its purpose is not 221
allow firms to choose the most attractive corporate law regime.
But the latter alleged purpose is not really reflected in the text of the
TEC. Hence, it was not difficult for the Court of Justice to decide in
favor of the application of the Freedom of Establishment.
By contrast, it would be extremely challenging from a doctrinal
perspective to reason that a Member State violates the Freedom of
Establishment by refusing domestic corporations the right to choose
another Member State's corporate law in their articles of
As mentioned before, TEC Article 43(1)(1) gives
incorporation.
European citizens the right to establish themselves in the territory of
Opting for another Member State's
other Member States.2 2 2
corporate law without setting up a business in that state or
incorporating there, however, can hardly be categorized as
establishing oneself in that state. Moreover, the Court has long
adhered to the principle that the fundamental freedoms do not apply
to purely internal situations, in which a state burdens its own
citizens. 223 Yet it is precisely such an internal situation that arises

RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr [RIW] 298, 298 (1986) (arguing that the
real seat doctrine does not violate the Freedom of Establishment); Carsten Thomas
Ebenroth, Neuere Entwicklungen im deutschen internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht
[Recent Developments Regarding the German Rules Governing Conflicts of Laws in the
Field of Corporate Law], 43 JURISTENZEITUNG 18, 24 (1988) (on file with author)
(suggesting that the real seat doctrine does not violate T.E.C. Art. 43); Bernhard
Grolpfeld, Die "ausldndischejuristische Person & Co. KG" [The Limited Partnership
with a Foreign Corporation as General Partner], 6 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN
PRIVATRECHTS [IPRAX] 145, 145 (1986) (on file with author) (arguing that the real seat
doctrine does not violate Art. 43 of the TEC).
See, e.g., KIENINGER, supra note 158, at 145-46; Hans-Georg Koppensteiner,
220.
Centros und die Folgen [Centros and the Consequences], in GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT IN
DER DISKUSSION 1999 151, 163 (Gesellschaftsrechtliche Vereinigung ed., 2000) (on file
with author); Daniel Zimmer, "Mysterium Zentros." Von der schwierigen Suche nach
der Bedeutung eines Urteiles des EuropdischenGerichtshofes ["Mystery Centros." Of the
Difficult Search for the Meaning of a Judgment by the European Court of Justice], 164
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZHR] 23, 40
(2000) (on file with author).
221.
See sources cited supra note 220.
Cf. T.E.C., supra note 10, art. 43 ("Within the framework of the
222.
prohibitions set out below, restrictions on the Freedom of Establishment of nationals of
one Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited.").
See, e.g., Case 204/87, Criminal Proceedings against Guy Bekaert, 1988
223.
13, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 655, 660 (1988); Case 20/87, Minist&re public v.
E.C.R. 2029,
Andr6 Gauchard, 1987 E.C.R. 4879, 13, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 489, 500-01 (1989); Case
298/84, Paolo Iorio v. Azienda autonoma delle ferrovie dello Stato, 1986 E.C.R. 247,
17, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 665, 671 (1986). In the literature see, for example, Walter
Frenz & Inds Grande, Versteckte Diskriminierungen am Schnittpunkt von
Niederlassungs- und Dienstleistungsfreiheit [Hidden Discrimination at the Dividing
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when a Member State denies its own corporations the freedom to
freely choose the corporate law norms that govern their internal
affairs. In sum, it would be extremely difficult to justify why the
Freedom of Establishment should give corporations the right to
choose the applicable state law in their articles of incorporation.
Apart from these doctrinal considerations, a second factor should
not go unmentioned. Centros, Uberseering, and Inspire Art have
ushered in the state of incorporation doctrine by making it clear that
the real seat rule, in its current form, is not compatible with the
Freedom of Establishment. 224 That does not mean, however, that the
Court actually intended to pave the way for free choice in corporate
law. Rather, there is some circumstantial evidence that the Court
simply hoped to prod the Member States toward further
harmonization. In particular, two factors deserve attention. First,
one should note the political environment in which the Centros
decision was handed down. At the time, harmonization in the field of
corporate law had reached an impasse; Europeans had been trying for
decades to create a European company statute. 225 But before
Centros, these attempts had gone nowhere.
The central issue
dividing the Member States was the participation of employees in the
company's management. 2 26 Not surprisingly, Germany did not want
to abandon its codetermination laws, while other Member
States-particularly the United Kingdom-were unwilling to accept
22 7
mandatory rules on codetermination.
From the outset, Centros had the potential to break this
deadlock. That can be explained as follows: the German rules on
codetermination are worded in such a way that they only apply to
corporations formed under German law. 228 If Germany recognizes

Line Between the Freedom of Establishment and the Freedom to Provide Services], 13
EUROPAISCHES WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERRECHT

[EWS] 555, 557 (2002) (on file with

author).
224.
See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
225.
See, e.g., Christian Kersting, Corporate Choice of Law-A Comparison of
the United States and European Systems and a Proposalfor a European Directive, 28
BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 1, 54 (2002).

226.
Id. at 55.
227.
Cf. Mike Smith, Agreement will ease corporate operations across EU.
European Company Statute 30-Year Block Lifted After Pact on Worker Representation,
FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 9, 2000, at 5 (noting that "[t]he 30-year block on a company
statute resulted from the different traditions on worker involvement, from Germany,
where participation is strong, to countries such as Spain and the United Kingdom,
where it is more limited").
228.
The various German statutes on codetermination explicitly list the
organizational forms to which they are applicable, and they only name certain German
organizational forms such as the Aktiengesellschaft (stock corporation) or the
Gesellschaft mit beschrinkter Haftung (Limited Liability Company). See Gesetz iber
die Mitbestimmung von Arbeitnehmern (MitbestG), v. 4.5.1976 (BGB1. I S.1153);
Gesetz zur Erganzung des Gesetzes iber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den
Aufsichtsraten und Vorstanden der Unternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und
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pseudo-foreign corporations-as demanded by Centros-the relevant
rules can be circumvented relatively easily, at least by newly formed
businesses. At the same time, Centros has not made it entirely clear
whether it would be legal to modify the German rules in such a way
as to ensure their application to pseudo-foreign corporations. After
all, the Member States retain the right, under Centros, to impose
restrictions on foreign corporations, provided that these restrictions
are a necessary and proportionate means to achieve imperative
requirements

in

the public interest. 2 29

Consequently, one

can

reasonably argue that the Centros decision does not stand in the way
of a legislative amendment to the German rules on codetermination
that would extend their scope of application to pseudo-foreign
corporations. 23 0 Against this background, it is not hard to see why
Centros was bound to increase the Member States' willingness to
reach a compromise; from Germany's perspective, Centros could be
read as a warning that the Court would no longer tolerate inactivity
in the field of corporate law harmonization and that the Freedom of

Stahl erzeugenden Industrie (MitBestErgG), v. 7.8.1956 (BGB1. I S.707);
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1952 (BetrVG), Oct. 1952 (BGBl. I S.681); Gesetz fiber die
Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtsraten und Vorstanden der
Unternehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und Stahl erzeugenden Industrie (MontanMitbestG), v. 21.5.1951 (BGB1. I S.347). Moreover, under the prevailing view, the
relevant statutes cannot be applied to foreign corporations by analogy. See, e.g.,
10 (4th ed.
THOMAS RAISER, MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ [CODETERMINATION ACT] § 1,
2002); Peter Ulmer, Schutzinstrumente gegen die Gefahren aus der Gewerbstdtigkeit
inldndischerZweigniederlassungen von Kapitalgesellschaftenmit fiktivem Auslandssitz
[Protective Mechanisms Against the Risks Resulting from the Activities of Domestic
Branch Offices of Pseudo-Foreign Corporations], 54 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 662, 663
(1999) (on file with author).
229.
Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R.
The Attorney General La Pergola,
34, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551, 586 (1999).
1-1459,
who wrote the corresponding opinion, also pointed to the option of harmonization: "[I]n
the absence of harmonisation, competition among rules must be allowed free play in
corporate matters." See Opinion of Mr Advocate General La Pergola, Case C-212/97,
20, [1999] 2
Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabbsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459,
C.M.L.R. 551, 576 (1999).
See Jens C. Dammann, The Future of Codetermination after Centros: Will
230.
German Law Move Closer to the U.S. Model?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 607, 685
(2003). Indeed, this view now seems to have gained ground in the legal literature. See,
e.g, Roth, supra note 162, at 199 (claiming that workers' codetermination is "at first
sight, a convincing candidate for a 'general interest'-justification"). But see Horst
und
Gesellschaften
europdischer
Zweigniederlasssungsfreiheit
Hammen,
Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer auf Unternehmensebene [Branch Offices of European
Corporations and Codetermination on the Level of the Enterprise], 45 WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNGEN [WMI] 2487, 2495 (1999) (on file with author) (arguing that Germany
cannot extend the scope of its codetermination rules to cover pseudo-foreign
und
Gesellschaftsrecht
Internationales
Zimmer,
Daniel
corporations);
Niederlassungsfreiheit:Das Rdtsel vor der Ldsung? [Rules Governing Conflicts of Laws
in CorporateMatters and the Freedom of Establishment:A Riddle About to be Solved?],
55 BETRIEBS-BERATER [BB] 1361, 1365-66 (2000) (on file with author) (doubting
whether the German system of codetermination is justified by an imperative
requirement in the sense of the European Community law).
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Establishment might be used as a means of allowing corporations to
avoid completely the German rules on codetermination. At the same
time, the Member States opposed to codetermination could not be
certain that they would succeed by holding out. After all, it did not
seem-and still does not seem-impossible that the Court will consider
the application of Germany's codetermination rules to be justified by
mandatory requirements. In sum, both adherents and opponents of
codetermination had every reason to reach a compromise.
It should be noted, furthermore, that if it was the wish of the
Court to promote the harmonization of European corporate law, that
strategy has already borne fruit. In 2001, little more than two years
after the Centros decision, the Member States reached a compromise
regarding the so-called European Company, 23 1 including the issue of
232
codetermination.
The impression that Centros was not an attempt at ushering in
an era of free choice, but was instead intended to promote further
harmonization, is reinforced by the decision's wording. In part, the
judgment almost reads as an invitation to eliminate the opportunity
for state competition it creates. As the Court states:
[The fact that a national of a Member State who wishes to set up a
company chooses to form it in the Member State whose rules of
company law seem to him the least restrictive . . . cannot, in itself,
constitute an abuse of the right of establishment ....
[1it is always
open to the Council, on the basis of the powers conferred upon it by
Article 54(3)(g)
of the
EC
Treaty,
to achieve
complete
233
harmonization.

In sum, there are no less than two explanations as to why the
European Court of Justice has failed to grant corporations the right
to choose the applicable state law in their articles of incorporation.
First, such a course of action would have been next to impossible to
justify from a doctrinal perspective. Second, the Court may never
have intended to set the stage for free choice in corporate law in the
first place.
2. The United States
Why have U.S. courts never recognized the right of corporations
to choose the applicable corporate law in their articles of
incorporation? At first glance, it seems that they could have done so
much more easily than the European Court of Justice. After all,

231.
See Council Regulation 215712001 on the Statute for a European Company,
2001 O.J. (L 294) 1.
232.
See Council Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the Statute for a
European Company with regard to the involvement of employees, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 22.
233.
Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R.
1-1459,
27-28, [1999] 2 C. M.L.R. 551 (1999).
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given that U.S. corporations traditionally enjoy free choice in
corporate law, it would have been a comparatively small step to
recognize also their right to exercise free choice via a choice-of-law
provision in their articles of incorporation. But even in the United
States, doctrinal obstacles unrelated to efficiency considerations may
have prevented courts from adopting such an approach.
Early U.S. jurisprudence tended to view the corporation as a
In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, the
mere legal fiction.
corporation was seen as an "invisible, intangible, and artificial being,
[a] mere legal entity."234 This reasoning, of course, has obvious
implications for the issue at hand. If a corporation is but the creation
of the law of the jurisdiction in which it was formed, then it follows
that the corporation's internal affairs must be governed by that law
alone. As Marshall stated in a later opinion, "[b]eing the mere
creature of law, [the corporation] possesses only those properties
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or
as incidental to its very existence." 235 That line of reasoning proved to
be highly influential.2 3 6 State courts relied on it to explain why
corporations cannot go beyond the rules imposed by the state of
incorporation. Thus, it has been stressed that "[a] corporation is a
purely artificial body created by law. It can act only in accordance
23 7
with the law of its creation."
To be sure, the view of the corporation as a legal fiction is
unlikely to have played a decisive role in more recent times.
Nevertheless, the basic problem remains: each corporate law regime
defines the preconditions for the formation of a corporation and the
rules governing the affairs of such corporations. How, then, can a
court allow corporations to deviate from these conditions by referring
to another state's law, without disobeying the legislature? The
difficulty of answering that question in a satisfactory manner is
reinforced by the state statutes governing corporate law. Corporate
codes tend to specify the types of provisions that the articles of
incorporation may contain, 238 typically requiring that the provisions
contained therein must not be contrary to the laws of the state of
incorporation. 239 That limitation, of course, only makes sense if one

234.
Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 86 (1809).
Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
235.
Cf., e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
236.
There, the Court relied on Marshall's view of the corporation as an artificial being to
justify the interest of the state of incorporation in regulating the internal affairs of its
own corporations.
237.
See In re Brophy, 179 A. 128, 129 (N.J. 1935) (quotingIn re Amer. Fibre); In
re Am. Fibre Chair Seat Corp., 193 N.E. 253, 255 (N.Y. 1934); In re Crown Heights
Hosp., Inc., 49 N.Y.S.2d 658, 660 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944).
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2003).
238.
239.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (2003).
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assumes that corporations cannot, in their articles of incorporation,
declare the law of the state of incorporation to be inapplicable.
All in all, even if one shares the view advanced in this Articlenamely, that it would be efficient to grant corporations the right to
choose the applicable state law in their articles of incorporation-it is
evident why courts and legislators in the United States and in Europe
have so far failed to adopt such an approach.

VII. CONCLUSION

Free choice in corporate law is no longer a concept confined to
the United States or Canada. Rather, three recent decisions by the
Court of Justice, Centros, Uberseering, and Inspire Art, have ushered
in the age of charter competition in the European Community. Very
likely, they also herald the coming of an era marked by transatlantic
charter competition.
Against this background, it is high time to focus not only on the
general desirability of free choice in corporate law, but also on the
question of how free choice should best be granted, be it in the U.S.,
the European, or the transatlantic arena. Traditionally, the only
mechanism by which corporations can exercise free choice has been
the state of incorporation doctrine, under which a corporation's
internal affairs are governed by the law of the state of incorporation.
It is important to note, however, that the state of incorporation
doctrine has a number of significant drawbacks because it does not
allow corporations to choose a foreign state's corporate law in
isolation. Rather, it forces them to accept a number of side effects
that may discourage them from incorporating in the jurisdiction with
the law they find most efficient. These side effects include exposure
to litigation in the state of incorporation. As far as the transatlantic
charter market is concerned, pseudo-foreign corporations may in
addition face a higher income tax burden.
Finally, European
corporations incorporating in the United States risk the application of
U.S. securities law.

In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of
incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of incorporation
may also contain any or all of the following matters: (1) Any provision for the
management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the
corporation, and any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the
powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any class of
the stockholders, or the members of a nonstock corporation; if such provisions
are not contrary to the laws of this State.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(1); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b) (1984) ("The
articles of incorporation may set forth . . . provisions not inconsistent with law
regarding ....).
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That the state of incorporation doctrine is, in many respects,
deficient as a mechanism for exercising free choice in corporate law
cannot come as a surprise. The state of incorporation doctrine does
Rather, the
not owe its exclusivity to efficiency considerations.
explanation for the primacy of the state of incorporation doctrine is as
follows: lawmakers are typically hostile to free choice because they
do not wish to relinquish their influence over locally operated
corporations. Hence, free choice had to be granted by the courts. For
the judiciary, however, the state of incorporation doctrine offers an
easy way to justify the application of the legal regime that a
corporation has chosen.
Against this background, it is desirable that the state of
incorporation doctrine be complemented with what has been called in
this Article a statutory approach to free choice. Federal law should
allow corporations to choose the applicable state law in their articles
of incorporation. Corporations could thus determine freely which
corporate law regime should govern their internal affairs. The law of
the state of incorporation should only be the default that governs if
the articles do not contain any choice-of-law clause. To preserve the
states' incentive to compete, federal law could require the state of
incorporation to force its corporations to pay franchise fees to those
states whose law is declared applicable. The amount to be paid could
be determined freely by the recipient state.
The relevance of the statutory approach to free choice has been
shown with regard to the transatlantic charter market. Currently,
such a charter market does not exist. One could attempt to explain
this by pointing to certain factors that are unrelated to the
shortcomings of the state of incorporation doctrine. The traditional
prevalence of the real seat doctrine in Europe, rules that prevent
migrating between
U.S. and European
corporations from
jurisdictions, or a lack of demand for U.S. corporate law might be
cited in this context. But all of these factors are insufficient to
explain the general unwillingness of European firms to incorporate in
jurisdictions on the other side of the Atlantic. Hence, one has to
conclude that the drawbacks of the state of incorporation doctrine
play a decisive role in preventing the emergence of a transatlantic
charter market.

